Innovations in the War on Tax Evasion by Kaye, Tracy A.
BYU Law Review
Volume 2014 | Issue 2 Article 5
5-31-2014
Innovations in the War on Tax Evasion
Tracy A. Kaye
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tracy A. Kaye, Innovations in the War on Tax Evasion, 2014 BYU L. Rev. 363 (2014).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2014/iss2/5
DO NOT DELETE 7/14/2014 4:14 PM 
 
363 
Innovations in the War on Tax Evasion 
Tracy A. Kaye* 
ABSTRACT 
Offshore tax evasion is a global problem that requires a global 
solution. Nevertheless, the United States unilaterally responded to 
the offshore tax evasion problem by enacting the Foreign Account 
Tax Compliance Act. FATCA requires foreign banks to report 
information about financial accounts held by U.S. taxpayers directly 
to the Internal Revenue Service and imposes a thirty percent 
withholding tax on certain U.S. payments to any bank that will not 
cooperate. Yet, U.S. banks were not required to report any 
information on nonresident account holders (except for Canadians) 
to anyone. 
FATCA garnered worldwide attention. The European Union 
expressed its concerns to the U.S. Treasury about the compliance 
burden on the financial industry and the conflict with EU Member 
States’ laws on privacy and data protection. Treasury is resolving 
these issues by negotiating bilateral agreements known as 
Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs) that will require reciprocity 
on the part of the United States in the exchange of information. 
These IGAs are furthering the movement toward global transparency 
as most FATCA partner jurisdictions intend to require reporting on 
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all nonresident accounts rather than just U.S. accounts. This could 
lead to the development of a multilateral platform for the exchange 
of information that is critical to combating offshore tax evasion. 
This Article urges the United States to adopt the regulations and 
legislation that are necessary before the United States can provide its 
FATCA partners with the same information that they have been 
asked to give the U.S. government. The United States should play a 
leadership role in furthering global transparency and take the steps 
required to no longer function as a tax haven for tax evaders from 
other countries. The IGA with Mexico that entered into force on 
January 1, 2013, is an appropriate vehicle for the United States to 
demonstrate this renewed commitment to the exchange of 
information. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Offshore tax evasion is a global problem.1 It requires a global 
solution. Nevertheless, the United States chose a unilateral response 
to the offshore tax evasion problem that could no longer be ignored 
after the Swiss bank UBS scandal. The Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act (FATCA) was enacted in 2010 as part of the Hiring 
Incentives to Restore Employment Act2 and essentially enlists 
foreign financial institutions to report directly to the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) certain information about financial accounts 
held by U.S. taxpayers or by foreign entities in which U.S. taxpayers 
hold a substantial ownership interest.3 Failure to do so will result in a 
withholding tax on a variety of payments from the United States to 
these nonparticipating financial institutions.4 
This garnered worldwide attention. A letter from the European 
Union to the IRS and U.S. Treasury expressed concerns about the 
 
 1. A report by the Tax Justice Network estimates between $21 trillion to $32 trillion 
of unreported private financial wealth was held offshore by wealthy individuals at the end of 
2010. See James S. Henry, The Price of Offshore Revisited, TAX JUST. NETWORK, 36 (July, 5 
2012), 
http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Price_of_Offshore_Revisited_120722.pdf. The 
Tax Justice Network is an independent organization that focuses on the harmful effects of tax 
evasion, tax competition, and tax havens. About Tax Justice Network, TAX JUSTICE NETWORK, 
http://www.taxjustice.net/about/who-we-are/goals/. 
 2. Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, § 501–35, 
124 Stat. 71, 97–115 (2010) [hereinafter HIRE Act]. 
 3. See I.R.C. § 1471(b) (2012). 
 4. See I.R.C. § 1471(a) (2012). 
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compliance burden on the EU financial industry and the potential 
conflict with the various EU Member States’ laws on privacy and 
data protection.5 The European Union Savings Directive took effect 
in the Member States in 2005 and inter alia enables Member States’ 
tax administrations to automatically exchange information on an 
individual’s interest income.6 Given the European Unions’ initiatives 
in information exchange, the European Commission had hopes of 
negotiating an EU-wide accommodation. 
In a speech on January 24, 2012, before the New York State Bar 
Association, Acting Assistant Treasury Secretary McMahon 
acknowledged that some countries face legal impediments to 
complying with the requirement to report account holder 
information directly to the IRS.7 For example, the German Banking 
Industry Committee pointed out several areas of potential legal 
conflicts such as national data protection laws conflicting with 
FATCA requirements and national public and/or civil laws 
conflicting with the requirements to terminate certain customer 
relationships.8 Acting Assistant Treasury Secretary McMahon 
observed that foreign governments had previously revised their laws 
to accommodate the Qualified Intermediary program but stated that 
the Treasury was exploring an intergovernmental approach to 
address this problem.9 
On February 8, 2012, the Treasury Department issued a joint 
statement announcing that it was negotiating agreements with the 
 
 5. See Annex to Letter from European Union to U.S. Treasury, IRS on Impact of 
FATCA on European Financial Service Industry, 11 TaxCore No. 67, Apr. 7, 2011; see also 
Joe Kirwin, EU Letter to IRS, Treasury Raises Concerns over Impact of FATCA on Financial 
Services, BNA Daily Tax Rep., March 24, 2011, No. 57, at I-2; see also Press Release, 
European Comm’n., Taxation: EU/US Dialogue on the Foreign Account Tax Compliance 
Act (Apr. 06, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-413_en.htm 
(confirming letter). 
 6. Council Directive 2003/48, on Taxation of Savings Income in the Form of Interest 
Payments, 2003 O.J. (L 157) 38, 43, 45 [hereinafter Savings Directive] (regarding the 
taxation of savings income). 
 7. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Remarks by Acting Assistant Secretary Emily 
McMahon at the NY State Bar Association Annual Meeting (Jan. 25, 2012), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1399.aspx [hereinafter 
McMahon Remarks]. 
 8. Letter from German Banking Industry Committee to U.S. Dep’t of Treasury at 4 
(May 10, 2011), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/Tax/us_tax_GBIC_100511_122011.pdf. 
 9. McMahon Remarks, supra note 7. See infra Part IV (discussion of Qualified 
Intermediary Program). 
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United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain that would 
allow their financial institutions to provide the required U.S. account 
holder information to their own governments with reciprocal 
automatic information exchange between governments.10 Despite 
the movement toward “transnational tax information exchange 
networks,”11 the United States chose to resolve any issues that arise 
in the implementation of FATCA through bilateral agreements 
known as Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs).12 This continues 
the ad hoc approach, “reciprocal bargaining in the national interest” 
that characterizes international tax regulation, but does remove some 
of the criticisms regarding the extraterritoriality of the FATCA 
legislation.13 Furthermore, as evidenced by the OECD and EU 
reactions, the initial unilateral action of the United States appears to 
be having a snowball effect, forcing countries and international 
organizations to deal more expeditiously with the offshore tax 
evasion problem than otherwise would have occurred and will 
hopefully lead to a multilateral platform for the exchange of 
information. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part II traces 
the evolution of FATCA and explores its ramifications and the 
international response to its requirements. Part III focuses on one 
specific consequence of FATCA: the finalization of regulations on 
the reporting of nonresident alien bank deposit interest. Part IV 
provides some background on previous tax compliance programs, 
such as the Qualified Intermediary Program and the Offshore 
Volunteer Disclosure Program, including discussion of the respective 
failures and successes. Part V discusses the European Union’s 
initiatives with respect to information exchange and the impact of 
FATCA on these initiatives. Part VI highlights some proposals to 
 
 10. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Joint Statement from the U.S., Fr., Ger., It., 
Spain and the U.K. Regarding an Intergovernmental Approach to Improving Int’l Tax 
Compliance and Implementing FATCA (Feb. 8, 2012), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releas
es/documents/020712%20Treasury%20IRS%20FATCA%20Joint%20Statement.pdf. 
 11. Miranda Stewart, Transnational Tax Information Exchange Networks: Steps towards 
a Globalized, Legitimate Tax Administration, 4 WORLD TAX J. 152, 153 (2012). 
 12. For example, the United States could have worked through the Convention on 
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters. See Itai Grinberg, The Battle over Taxing 
Offshore Accounts, 60 UCLA L. REV. 304, 371–72 (2012). 
 13. Stewart, supra note 11, at 155 (citing J. BRAITHWAITE & P. DRAHOS, GLOBAL 
BUSINESS REGULATION (2000)). 
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further the movement toward global transparency and a multilateral 
platform for the exchange of information as well as the role that the 
United States should play. 
II. FOREIGN ACCOUNT TAX COMPLIANCE ACT 
One of the most important innovations in the U.S. war on 
offshore tax evasion is the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act 
(FATCA), which added Sections 1471 to 1474 to the Internal 
Revenue Code in 2010.14 FATCA requires U.S. taxpayers holding 
financial assets with an aggregate value exceeding $50,000 offshore 
to report those assets to the IRS beginning with their 2011 tax 
return.15 Failure to report foreign financial assets will result in a 
penalty of $10,000 (and a penalty up to $50,000 for continued 
failure after IRS notification).16 
The Bank Secrecy Act already requires U.S. taxpayers to file a 
Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) on June 
30th of each year that they have ownership of a foreign financial 
account of more than $10,000.17 The FBAR was intended to provide 
law enforcement with information primarily to combat illegal 
activities such as money laundering and expand protection against 
terrorist financing.18 However, the new form 8938 required by 
FATCA is used to report the total value of all specified foreign 
financial assets.19 This is a significant expansion because it includes 
 
 14. Sections 1471 to 1474 of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C. or Code) were 
enacted in the “Foreign Account Tax Compliance” title (Title V) of the HIRE Act. HIRE Act, 
supra note 2, at 97–115. 
 15. I.R.C. § 6038D(a) (2012). 
 16. I.R.C. § 6038D(d) (2012). Underpayments of tax attributable to non-disclosed 
foreign financial assets will be subject to an additional substantial understatement penalty of 40 
percent. See Instructions for Form 8938, IRS, (Nov. 2011), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i8938.pdf. 
 17. Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114–24 (1970) (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b, 1951–59 (2012); 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–22 (2012)); see also 
TD F 90-22.1, Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts IRS (Jan. 2012), available at 
http://bsaefiling.fincen.treas.gov/NoRegFBARFiler.html. In 2009, 543,043 FBARs were 
filed. Susan C. Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Formation Under High-Penalty Regimes, 44 
CONN. L. REV. 675, 701 (2012) (citing to a 2010 TIGTA report). 
 18. See 12 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012) (discussing usefulness of reports in criminal and tax 
proceedings as Congressional purpose); see also 31 U.S.C. § 5311(2012) (concerning 
protection from international terrorism as purpose). 
 19. Form 8938, Statement of Specified Foreign Financial Assets, IRS (Nov. 2011), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8938.pdf. 
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foreign stock or securities not held in a financial account as well as 
investment vehicles, such as foreign hedge funds and foreign private 
equity funds.20 These are not required to be reported on the FBAR. 
But more importantly, FATCA imposes reporting requirements 
on the foreign banks where U.S. taxpayers are holding these offshore 
accounts.21 Using third parties to increase compliance with the 
federal income tax has been a highly successful technique in the U.S. 
system.22 “This bill offers foreign banks a simple choice—if you wish 
to access our capital markets, you have to report on U.S. account 
holders,” said Rangel (then Chairman of the House Ways and Means 
Committee), in the press release for FATCA.23 Thus, not later than 
March 31, 2015,24 a foreign financial institution (FFI) will be 
required to annually file reports directly to the IRS regarding 
financial accounts held by U.S. taxpayers or by foreign entities in 
which U.S. taxpayers hold a substantial ownership interest,25 with 
respect to U.S. account information for calendar year 2014. 
FATCA requires that foreign financial institutions enter into 
agreements with the IRS that obligate the “participating” FFI to 
perform identification and due diligence procedures concerning 
account holders.26 There is a different level of diligence expected 
with respect to individual accounts and entity accounts and between 
new and preexisting accounts.27 It is expected that FFIs that comply 
with the due diligence guidelines will be deemed compliant with the 
requirement to identify U.S. accounts and not held to the strict 
liability standard. 
 
 20. This includes foreign partnership interests. See Instructions for Form 8938, supra 
note 16, at 4. 
 21. I.R.C. § 1471(c)(1) (2012). 
 22. Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax 
Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 698 (2008). 
 23. Lee A. Sheppard, Getting Serious About Offshore Evasion, 56 TAX NOTES INT’L 399, 
402 (2009). 
 24. The final regulations phase in implementation of the reporting requirements. See 
Regulations Relating to Information Reporting by Foreign Financial Institutions and 
Withholding on Certain Payments to Foreign Financial Institutions and Other Foreign 
Entities, 78 Fed. Reg. 5874, 5877 (2013) [hereinafter FATCA Preamble]. These dates were 
further amended by 78 Fed. Reg. 55202, 55203 (2013). 
 25. I.R.C. § 1473(2)(A) defines a substantial U.S. owner as a person owning an interest 
greater than 10 percent directly or indirectly. 
 26. See I.R.C. § 1471(b)(1)(A), (B) (2012). 
 27. Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-4(c) (2012). 
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The enforcement mechanism is that the participating FFIs agree 
to withhold thirty percent of U.S.-source income paid to (a) 
nonparticipating FFIs (known as passthru payments),28 (b) individual 
account holders who fail to provide sufficient information to 
determine whether they are a U.S. person,29 or (c) foreign entity 
account holders who fail to provide sufficient information about the 
identity of its substantial U.S. owners.30 Approximately four hundred 
pages of proposed regulations interpreting FATCA were released in 
February 2012.31 This guidance did contain an exception from the 
withholding requirement for local FFIs where at least ninety-eight 
percent of their accounts are held by residents of the country in 
which the FFI is organized.32 
The IRS held a public hearing with respect to this guidance on 
May 15, 2012, where financial industry representatives expressed 
concerns over the complexity and pleaded for the IRS to simplify the 
regulations and to delay various effective dates.33 Witnesses 
representing both foreign and domestic financial institutions as well 
as investment funds “focused their testimony primarily on 
documentation burdens, modifying effective dates, conflicts with 
local law, and the regs’ [sic] overall complexity.”34 There was a 
“sharp demand for IRS to conform its account identification and 
documentation requirements to the . . . rules that foreign banks 
already have in place[.]”35 Representatives from “countries ranging 
 
 28. See I.R.C. § 1471(a); see also I.R.C. § 1471(b)(1)(D)(i); I.R.C. § 1471(d)(7) 
(defining “passthru” payments as any withholding payment). 
 29. See I.R.C. § 1471(d)(6) (specifying that an account holder who fails to provide 
information sufficient to determine whether the account is a U.S. account is a recalcitrant 
account holder). 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Internal Revenue Service, Regulations Relating to Information Reporting by 
Foreign Financial Institutions and Withholding on Certain Payments to Foreign Financial 
Institutions and Other Foreign Entities, (Feb. 8, 2012), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/reg-121647-10.pdf. 
 32. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-5(f)(1)(i)(A)(5), 77 Fed. Reg. at 9090; see also Wesley 
Elmore & Kristen A. Parillo, Proposed FATCA Regulations Explained, 134 TAX NOTES 1069, 
1070 (2012). 
 33. See Shamik Trivedi, Bank Representatives Seek Delay of FATCA Regs, 66 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 695 (2012). 
 34. Id. at 695. 
 35. Alison Bennett, Financial Institutions: Witnesses Urge IRS to Give Banks More Time 
to Comply with FATCA, Air Many Concerns, BNA DAILY TAX REP., May 16, 2012, at GG-1. 
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from Australia to Japan” expressed the “universal message: Give us 
more time.”36 
In response to the growing concern over the looming deadlines, 
the IRS has twice announced later implementation dates for the due 
diligence and documentation procedures as well as the reporting 
requirements under FATCA.37 The new timelines aligned the 
regulatory guidance for U.S. withholding agents and FFIs in 
countries without IGAs with the deadlines specified in the IGAs. 
Financial institutions were also given more time to implement system 
changes.38 The proposed regulations were finalized on January 17, 
2013, and coordinate the regulatory obligations of financial 
institutions with those found in the various intergovernmental 
agreements.39 For example, the amended final regulations delay the 
effective date of the FFI agreement until April 25, 2014, for those 
participating FFIs that have received a global intermediary 
identification number.40 Adopting a risk-based approach to 
implementing the statute, the final regulations grandfather all 
obligations outstanding on July 1, 2014 from withholding and 
expand the categories of FFIs that are deemed compliant without 
having to enter into an agreement with the IRS.41 Accounts 
outstanding as of June 30, 2014, are treated as pre-existing 
accounts.42 
The final regulations also provide a transition rule for a FFI if it 
has one or more branches that cannot satisfy the obligations of the 
FFI agreement because those branches are operating in jurisdictions 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Timeline for Due Diligence and Other Requirements Under FATCA, 
Announcement 2012-42, 2012-47 Internal Revenue Bull. 561 (Nov. 19, 2012); Revised 
Timeline and Other Guidance Regarding the Implementation of FATCA, Notice 2013-43, 
2013-31 Internal Revenue Bull. 113, 114 (July 29, 2013). See also Jaime Arora, New FATCA 
Timelines Increase Conformity Between Regs, IGAs, 137 TAX NOTES 470 (2012). 
 38. Diane Freda, IRS Coordinates Due Diligence Timelines for Requirements Related to 
FATCA, BNA DAILY TAX REP., Oct. 25, 2012, at G-3. 
 39. See Regulations Relating to Information Reporting by Foreign Financial Institutions 
and Withholding on Certain Payments to Foreign Financial Institutions and Other Foreign 
Entities, 78 Fed. Reg. 5874, (Jan. 28, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 301); see also 
FATCA Preamble, supra note 24, at 5882. 
 40. FATCA Preamble, supra note 24, at 5882; see also Notice 2013-43, supra note 37, 
at 114. 
 41. FATCA Preamble, supra note 24, at 5876; see also Notice 2013-43, supra note 37, 
at 114. 
 42. Notice 2013-43, supra note 37, at 114. 
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with legal restrictions impeding FATCA compliance.43 If the FFI 
otherwise satisfies the requirements of a participating FFI, it will be 
allowed to become a participating FFI until December 31, 2015.44 
This deadline “puts pressure on FFIs to encourage other countries to 
sign IGAs”45 because signing an IGA with the United States is the 
most efficient way to overcome any legal impediments to FATCA 
implementation. 
FATCA provisions apply to “withholdable” payments made after 
June 30, 2014.46 The term “withholdable payment” includes any 
payment of U.S. source fixed or determinable (FDAP) income and 
any gross proceeds from sales or dispositions of property capable of 
producing U.S. source FDAP income. However, the term excludes 
certain payments, such as effectively connected income and ordinary 
course of business payments.47 Beginning July 1, 2014, the 
withholding requirements will apply to FDAP payments.48 After 
December 31, 2016, withholding will also apply to gross proceeds 
from the sale or disposition of any property capable of producing 
U.S. source FDAP income.49 Finally, withholding will eventually 
include “some foreign passthrough payments, derivatives that give 
rise to dividend equivalent payments, and obligations to make a 
payment regarding collateral posted on a notional principal 
contract.”50 
 
 43. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-4(e)(2)(i) (2013); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-
4(e)(2)(iii). 
 44. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-4(e)(2). There is a similar rule for “limited affiliates.” See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-4(e)(3). 
 45. Marie Sapirie, The Intersection of FATCA and IGAs, 138 TAX NOTES 405, 406 
(2013). 
 46. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-2(a)(1), 78 Fed. Reg. at 5911–12 (mandating 30 percent 
withholding of any “withholdable payment” unless excepted by an exemption or treated as a 
grandfathered obligation by § 1.1471-2(b)). Notice 2013-43 announced the IRS’s intent to 
amend the regulations. Notice 2013-43, supra note 37, at 113. 
 47. See I.R.C. § 1473(a) (2012); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1473-1(a), 78 Fed. Reg. at 
5981. 
 48. See I.R.C. § 1471(b) (2012); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-2(a)(1), 78 Fed. Reg. at 
5911–12. 
 49. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1473-1(a)(1)(ii), 78 Fed. Reg. at 5981. Note that IGAs do not 
require withholding on gross proceeds. Arora, supra note 37, at 471; see also Patrick Temple-
West, IRS Delays Key Start Dates For Global Tax Evasion Law, REUTERS, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/24/us-usa-tax-fatca-idUSBRE89N1PS20121024 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2013). 
 50. Arora, supra note 37, at 471; see also I.R.S. Announcement 2012-42, supra note 37. 
DO NOT DELETE 7/14/2014 4:14 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2014 
372 
FFIs entering into an agreement with the IRS are required to 
report certain information regarding their U.S. accounts, but the 
extent of the information requested is implemented in phases.51 The 
initial reporting requirements of 2014 have been extended to March 
31, 2015, and mandate only identifying information, such as name, 
address, account number, and TIN, as well as the balance of the 
account for calendar year 2014.52 Beginning in 2016, the aggregate 
amount of interest and dividends paid or credited to depository and 
custodial accounts in calendar year 2015 must be reported.53 Finally, 
in 2017 “full reporting” is required to include information on gross 
proceeds from broker transactions in calendar year 2016.54 
The same day that the proposed regulations were released, the 
Treasury Department also released a joint statement with the United 
Kingdom, French, German, Italian, and Spanish governments 
regarding an intergovernmental approach that would allow the 
financial institutions of these countries to report the required 
FATCA information to their own governments. The respective 
government would then transmit the data to the IRS (Treasury 
Model I).55 The framework for the intergovernmental approach 
would include elimination of the obligation of the FFI to negotiate a 
separate agreement with the IRS.56 Treasury officials stressed that 
these IGAs are solely an alternative approach to obtaining the 
information required by FATCA, not an exception to the statute.57 
The European Commissioner of Taxation has stated that the goal is 
to develop a Model Agreement that could be used by all of the 
Member States and ultimately lead to automatic information 
exchange between countries.58 
 
 51. See I.R.C. § 1471(c)(1); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-4(d)(1), 78 Fed. Reg. at 
5951. 
 52. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-4(d)(7)(ii)(A), 78 Fed. Reg. at 5955; see also Notice 2013-
43, supra note 37, at 115 (limited reporting of identifying information with respect to calendar 
year 2014). 
 53. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-4(d)(7)(ii)(B), 78 Fed. Reg. at 5955; see also Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.1471-4(d)(4)(iv), 78 Fed. Reg. at 5953. 
 54. See FATCA Preamble, supra note 24, at 5877 (respecting calendar year 2016). 
 55. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, supra note 10. 
 56. Id. at 2. 
 57. Alison Bennett, Much Work Ahead on Information Sharing Agreements Under 
FATCA, Official Says, BNA DAILY TAX REP., Feb. 21, 2012, No. 33, at G-1. 
 58. Alison Bennett, Semeta Says EU Member States Working Toward Uniform Model 
Pacts Under FATCA, BNA DAILY TAX REP., May 8, 2012, No. 88, at J-1. 
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The Treasury Department is engaged in active negotiations with 
more than fifty countries and jurisdictions; thus it is conceivable that 
FATCA could become the worldwide standard.59 Speaking at the 
ABA Tax Section Plenary luncheon on January 26, 2013, McMahon 
said, “[u]ltimately we believe that these intergovernmental 
frameworks can serve as a basis for the development of a broader 
system of global information exchange and the establishment of a 
common intergovernmental approach to combating offshore tax 
evasion.”60 
This is an extremely important development. One ramification is 
that the United States realized that in order to undertake these 
bilateral arrangements, it will also have to be willing to provide these 
countries with information.61 “In this regard the United States is 
willing to reciprocate in collecting and exchanging on an automatic 
basis information on accounts held in U.S. financial institutions by 
residents of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom.”62 Speaking on behalf of the Treasury, Assistant Secretary 
McMahon stated: 
[W]e recognize that bilateral solutions require reciprocity. . . . 
[W]e see no principled basis on which to require that financial 
institutions based in other countries collect and provide us with 
information on U.S. taxpayers, if we take the position that our own 
institutions should be exempt from similar requirements. To the 
contrary, we believe that it will be critical to the success of our 
efforts to implement FATCA that we are able to reciprocate.63 
 
 59. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, U.S. Engaging with More than 50 
Jurisdictions to Curtail Offshore Tax Evasion (Nov. 8, 2012), 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1759.aspx; see also Jeremiah 
Coder, Extensive FATCA Negotiations Underway, Treasury Announces, 137 TAX NOTES 722 
(2012). It has also been reported by unofficial sources that there are ongoing negotiations with 
China. Vanessa Houldner et al., US Deal on Tax Reporting Rules Eases Foreign Bank Fears, 
FIN. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2012, 8:00 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/31ed2cbe-527f-
11e1-ae2c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2448nAmph. Without cooperation from the world’s 
second-largest economy, FATCA’s effectiveness may be diluted. See Patrick Temple-West, U.S. 
in Talks with Dozens of Nations on Anti-tax Dodge Pacts, REUTERS, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/08/us-usa-tax-havens-
idUSBRE8A71LY20121108 (last visited Jan. 11, 2013). 
 60. Kristen A. Parillo, Treasury Working to Expand FATCA Agreement Network, 138 
TAX NOTES 568, 568 (2013). 
 61. See McMahon Remarks, supra note 7. 
 62. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, supra note 10, at 1. 
 63. See McMahon Remarks, supra note 7. 
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In some cases, this is information that the United States did not 
currently collect such as the bank deposit interest on nonresident 
account holders.64 However, at the May 2012 ABA Tax Section 
meeting in Washington D.C., a Treasury official stated that “even 
where agreements are negotiated that include reciprocity, this does 
not necessarily mean information will be shared on an item-by-item 
basis to exactly match what the United States receives from the other 
country.”65 Furthermore, “the government is working on specific 
procedures to ensure information shared with other countries would 
be kept secret,” checking “with other U.S. government agencies to 
determine their experience with sharing information with other 
countries,” as well as “consulting with other countries on their 
experiences with third-party countries.”66 According to Michael 
Plowgian, an attorney-adviser in the Treasury Office of Tax Policy, 
“the information will be shared only with jurisdictions where the 
United States has an agreement in place.”67 
On June 21, 2012, the Treasury Department released separate 
joint statements with Japan68 and Switzerland69 with respect to an 
alternative arrangement for implementing FATCA. Treasury Model 
II, as it is being referred to, retains the structure of direct reporting 
by the FFIs to the IRS followed by information exchange upon 
request by the governments choosing this alternative arrangement in 
lieu of the automatic exchange being promised under Treasury 
Model I.70 
The Japanese Joint Statement stresses a willingness to work 
together to develop a common model for the automatic exchange of 
 
 64. See infra Part IV. 
 65. Alison Bennett, IRS, Treasury Working with Other Countries on Single Model 
Agreement Under FATCA, BNA DAILY TAX REP., May 14, 2012, No. 92, at G-10. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Joint Statement from the United States and 
Japan Regarding a Framework for Intergovernmental Cooperation to Facilitate the 
Implementation of FATCA and Improve International Tax Compliance (June 21, 2012), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Documents/FATCA%20Joint%20Statement%20US-Japan.pdf [hereinafter Press 
Release–Japan]. 
 69. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Joint Statement from the United States and 
Switzerland Regarding a Framework for Cooperation to Facilitate the Implementation of 
FATCA (June 21, 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Documents/FATCA%20Joint%20Statement%20US-Switzerland.pdf. 
 70. See Press Release–Japan, supra note 68. 
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information over the medium term.71 Japan also agrees to direct and 
enable its FFIs that are not exempt or deemed compliant to register 
with the IRS and comply with official guidance that will be issued by 
the Japanese Financial Services Association (consistent with the 
FATCA reporting and due diligence rules).72 Like the Swiss, Japan 
will accept and honor requests for U.S. account information on an 
aggregate basis.73 
The United States agrees to eliminate the obligation of each 
compliant Japanese FFI to: (1) enter into a separate agreement with 
the IRS as long as it is registered with the IRS; (2) withhold on 
foreign passthru payments; and (3) terminate accounts of recalcitrant 
U.S. account holders.74 Treasury Model II allows the FFIs to obtain 
the consent of account holders so as to mitigate the legal obstacles of 
Japanese laws that prevent disclosure directly to the IRS.75 The 
Treasury Department released a template for an “Agreement 
between the United States of America and [FATCA Partner] for 
Cooperation to Facilitate the Implementation of FATCA” (Treasury 
Model II) in November 2012 that has since been updated.76 Japan 
and the United States issued a statement setting forth a Model II 
type intergovernmental cooperation framework allowing Japanese 
banks to report directly to the United States that is effective as of 
June 11, 2013.77 
Treasury Model II takes into consideration the special 
characteristics of the Swiss financial industry to address potential 
 
 71. See id. at 2. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, supra note 69, at 2. 
 74. See Press Release–Japan, supra note 68, at 3. 
 75. Id. at 2. 
 76. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Model 2 Template, Agreement between the United States 
of America and [FATCA Partner] for Cooperation to Facilitate the Implementation of 
FATCA, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx; see Model 2 Agreement, Preexisting TIEA or DTC 
(updated 11-4-2013) [hereinafter Treasury Model II]. 
 77. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Statement of Mutual Cooperation and 
Understanding between the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Authorities of Japan to 
Improve International Tax Compliance and to Facilitate Implementation of FATCA, (June 11, 
2013) available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx (FATCA-Statement-Japan-6-11-2013.pdf). “[T]he Japan-
U.S. arrangement appears to have been carefully drafted to avoid being called an agreement,” 
which would have necessitated approval by the Japanese Diet. Kristen A. Parillo, Japan, U.S. 
Release FATCA Statement, 2013 WTD 113-1 (June 12, 2013). 
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legal and contractual impediments.78 The Swiss Joint statement notes 
that the Swiss government would create an exception for FFIs from 
the Swiss Criminal Code that would ordinarily prevent Swiss 
Companies from performing acts for a foreign State.79 Switzerland 
also agreed that it would accept and honor group requests from the 
United States with respect to recalcitrant U.S. accounts on an 
aggregate basis.80 
The Swiss FATCA Cooperation Agreement was signed on 
February 14, 2013, and follows the business-to-government 
reporting approach of Treasury Model II.81 Those Swiss financial 
institutions not deemed compliant must enter into an agreement 
directly with the IRS and comply with the due diligence, reporting, 
and withholding requirements of the FFI agreement.82 The Enabling 
Clause of Article 4 of the Swiss FATCA Cooperation Agreement 
absolves any Swiss financial institutions with FFI agreements or 
registered with the IRS from any penalties under the Swiss Criminal 
Code.83 In return, the United States eliminates the withholding 
requirement under FATCA for Swiss FFIs.84 Furthermore, compliant 
Swiss FFIs are not required to terminate a recalcitrant U.S. account 
holder’s account85 or impose foreign passthru payment 
withholding.86 
This Swiss FATCA Cooperation Agreement is a major break-
through in U.S. negotiations with Switzerland and reflects 
tremendous progress in resolving the conflict between Switzerland’s 
bank secrecy laws and tax transparency at least with respect to the 
United States.87 Inconsistent with the “Rubik” agreements that 
 
 78. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, supra note 69, at 1. 
 79. Id. at 2. 
 80. Id. at 1. 
 81. Agreement between the United States of America and Switzerland for Cooperation 
to Facilitate the Implementation of FATCA U.S.-Switz., Feb. 14, 2013 [hereinafter Swiss 
FATCA Cooperation Agreement], available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/ treaties/Documents/FATCA-Agreement-Switzerland-2-14-2013.pdf. 
 82. Id. at 7. 
 83. Id. at 9. 
 84. Id. at 10. 
 85. Id. at 11. Note that the Swiss Competent Authority must exchange the requested 
information with the IRS within eight months from receipt of such a request. Id. 
 86. Id. (“The Parties are committed to work together . . . to develop a practical and 
effective alternative approach to achieve the policy objectives of foreign passthru payment and 
gross proceeds withholding that minimizes burden.”). 
 87. Missing from the Swiss FATCA Cooperation Agreement is language found in article 
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Switzerland has negotiated with Austria, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom,88 the Swiss FATCA Cooperation Agreement with the 
United States requires Swiss financial institutions to actually 
exchange information on U.S. account holders with the IRS 
including aggregate information on U.S. recalcitrant accounts.89 The 
U.S. Competent Authority would then be able to make a group 
request for the additional information once the Protocol has entered 
into force.90 The previously negotiated Protocol to the U.S.-Swiss 
Tax Convention signed in 2009 included an agreement to honor 
group requests, but unfortunately, the U.S. Senate has yet to ratify 
this Protocol.91 
The U.S. Treasury has also published two versions (Reciprocal 
Version and Nonreciprocal Version) of a Model Intergovernmental 
Agreement to Improve Tax Compliance and to Implement FATCA 
(Treasury Model I), reflecting the government-to-government 
information sharing approach.92 In Treasury Model I, the United 
States accepted the need to coordinate the FATCA reporting 
obligations with other U.S. tax reporting obligations of the foreign 
financial institutions to avoid duplicative reporting, and the United 
States committed to working together with the FATCA partners in 
 
5(2) of Treasury Model II on the development of common reporting and due diligence 
standards as well as a common model for automatic exchange of information. 
 88. See infra notes 263–76 for a discussion of the “Rubik” agreements. 
 89. Swiss FATCA Cooperation Agreement, supra note 81, art. 3, at 7–8. 
 90. Id. art. 5, at 9–10. 
 91. See Protocol Amending Tax Convention with Swiss Confederation, U.S.-Switz., 
Sept. 23, 2009, S. Treaty Doc. No. 112-1 (2011); see also Kristen A. Parillo, U.S. Senator Puts 
Hold on Pending Tax Treaties, 2012 WTD 5-1 (Jan. 9, 2012) (arguing that ratification delayed 
because of Senator Rand Paul’s objection to the information sharing provisions of the treaty). 
 92. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Releases Model 
Intergovernmental Agreement for Implementing the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act to 
Improve Offshore Tax Compliance and Reduce Burden (July 26, 2012), 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1653.aspx. Treasury revised 
the text of both versions of Treasury Model 1 on November 14, 2012, to reflect the texts of 
the negotiated IGAs. See U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Model Intergovernmental Agreement to 
Improve Tax Compliance and to Implement FATCA, available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/reciprocal.pdf [hereinafter 
Treasury Model I]; see also U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Model Intergovernmental Agreement to 
Improve Tax Compliance and to Implement FATCA [hereinafter Treasury Model I 
Nonreciprocal Version], available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Documents/nonreciprocal.pdf [hereinafter Treasury Model I Nonreciprocal Version]. 
For the November 4, 2013 versions of these models, see, for example, Model 1A IGA 
Reciprocal, Preexisting TIEA or DTC, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx. 
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the future to “achiev[e] common reporting and due diligence 
standards for financial institutions.”93 The IGAs enter into force 
either on January 1, 2013, or when notifications of completions of 
necessary internal procedures are made, whichever comes later.94 The 
IGA with Mexico is the only agreement that has actually entered into 
force as of January 1, 2013.95 
Countries that sign an IGA afford their financial institutions 
simplified FATCA implementation procedures because these 
countries (1) will be treated as compliant and not subject to the 
withholding requirements,96 (2) will not be required to close 
recalcitrant accounts or to withhold tax on such accounts,97 and (3) 
will be considered participating FFIs regardless of the status of their 
affiliates in other jurisdictions.98 The FATCA partner may allow its 
FFIs to choose between the due diligence procedures found in the 
regulations or those provided in the agreement.99 Other changes 
include the substitution of the concept of “controlling persons” (to 
be interpreted using the Recommendations of the Financial Action 
Task Force)100 for the definition of “substantial U.S. owner” found 
in the proposed regulations.101 Furthermore, the term “Financial 
 
 93. Treasury Model I, supra note 92, preamble, at 1. 
 94. Id., art. 7(1), at 14; see also Treasury Model I Nonreciprocal Version, supra note 92, 
art. 7(1), at 12. 
 95. See Agreement Between the Department of the Treasury of the United States of 
America and the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit of the United Mexican States to 
Improve International Tax Compliance Including with Respect to FATCA, U.S.-Mex., 
art.10(1), Nov. 19, 2012, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Agreement-Mexico-11-19-2012.pdf [hereinafter Mexico 
IGA]. 
 96. Treasury Model I, supra note 92, art. 4(1), at 11. 
 97. Id., art. 4(2), at 11; see also Treasury Model I Nonreciprocal Version, supra note 92, 
art. 4(2), at 10. 
 98. Treasury Model I, supra note 92, art. 4(5), at 12; see also Treasury Model I 
Nonreciprocal Version, supra note 92, art. 4(5), at 10. Some commentators have raised 
concerns about the extent of relief from the FATCA requirements and lack of enforcement 
mechanism to replace the withholding requirement. See, e.g., Lee Sheppard, FATCA 
Intergovernmental Agreements, 67 TAX NOTES INT’L 1083, 1086 (2012). 
 99. Mary C. Bennett et al, Treasury Opens New Chapter in FATCA Implementation, 
136 TAX NOTES 1299, 1306 (2012) (citing Treasury Model I, supra note 92, annex I,(I)(C), 
at 16); see also Treasury Model I Nonreciprocal Version, supra note 92, annex I,(I)(C), at 14. 
 100. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON 
COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION: 
THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS (2012), available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf. 
 101. Treasury Model I, supra note 92, art. 1(1)(nn), at 7; see also Treasury Model I 
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Institution” does not include persons engaged in investing and 
trading for their own accounts.102 Finally, Treasury Model I extends 
the first reporting date to September 30, 2015.103 
Under the nonreciprocal version of Treasury Model I, the IRS 
will not exchange information with respect to the FATCA partner’s 
residents’ accounts held in U.S. financial institutions.104 The 
nonreciprocal version could be used by foreign countries without a 
tax treaty or information exchange agreement with the U.S. to 
report the FATCA information to the IRS.105 This allows 
jurisdictions without a treaty relationship with the United States to 
take advantage of the “intergovernmental approach to implementing 
FATCA.”106 The Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary also has 
indicated that the United States would be amenable to 
simultaneously signing a tax information exchange agreement or 
using the Multilateral Convention on the Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters (Multilateral Convention).107 The 
Multilateral Convention is an agreement produced under the 
auspices of the OECD and the Council of Europe that “provides a 
legal framework to facilitate international cooperation through 
multi-country exchanges of tax information and assistance.”108 The 
 
Nonreciprocal Version, supra note 92, art. 1(1)(ii), at 7. 
 102. Bennett, supra note 99, at 1305; see also Treasury Model I, supra note 92, art. 
1(2)(j), at 2–3; Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-5(e)(1)(iii),) (2012); 78 Fed. Reg. at 5966; Treasury 
Model I Nonreciprocal Version, supra note 92, art. 1(2)(j), at 2–3. 
 103. Treasury Model I, supra note 92, art. 3(5), at 10; see also Treasury Model I 
Nonreciprocal Version, supra note 92, art. 3(5), at 9. 
 104. Kristen A. Parillo & Shamik Trivedi, Treasury Releases First FATCA Model 
Agreement, 136 TAX NOTES 482, 482 (2012). 
 105. Lee A. Sheppard, Eggert Provides Update on FATCA Intergovernmental Agreements, 
137 TAX NOTES 472, 473 (2012) (“Eggert said the United States would not sign a reciprocal 
version with countries that lacked robust protections to handle taxpayer information 
confidentiality and restrict its use to tax enforcement.”). 
 106. Kristen A. Parillo & Jaime Arora, Intergovernmental Agreements Could Be FATCA 
Reporting Vehicles, 136 TAX NOTES 987, 987 (2012). 
 107. Rick Mitchell, Corwin Says Lack of Information Exchange Vehicle Need Not Bar 
FATCA Implementation, BNA DAILY TAX REP., Sept. 24, 2012, no. 184, at I-2. 
 108. See The Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters—
Background, OECD, June 4, 2010, http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-
information/theconventiononmutualadministrativeassistanceintaxmatters-background.htm 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2013) (“Its objective is to enable each Party to the Convention to counter 
international tax evasion and better enforce its national tax laws, while at the same time 
respecting the rights of taxpayers.”). 
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United States signed the Multilateral Convention in 1989, and it was 
ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1991.109 
The OECD welcomed the “new model international tax 
agreement designed to improve cross-border tax compliance and 
boost transparency.”110 The endorsement included hosting a briefing 
session on the intergovernmental approach to FATCA where U.S. 
Treasury officials as well as British, French, Italian, Spanish, and 
German officials held discussions with European banks and others.111 
The OECD has pledged to work in coordination with interested 
countries to adapt the Treasury Model Agreements into a “common 
model for automatic exchange of information” as well as to design 
common systems for reporting and performing the due diligence tests.112 
This is unprecedented engagement with a single country’s tax 
legislation and speaks to the global frustration with the tax evasion 
problem. The OECD has already updated Article 26 of the OECD 
Model Tax Convention to allow for group requests of 
 
 109. Henry Ordower, United States of America, in: Experience with and Administrative 
Practice Concerning Mutual Assistance in Tax Affairs, in MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND 
INFORMATION EXCHANGE 569, 579 (Amsterdam, 2010) (noting that the United States 
reserved on the provisions regarding assistance for taxes of political subdivisions, collection 
assistance, and service of process except by mail). The Protocol amending the Convention on 
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters of May 27, 2010, was signed by the United 
States but is not yet in force. Stafford Smiley, Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax 
Matters, 3 J. CORP. TAX’N 40 (2013). 
 110. Press Release, OECD, Tax: OECD Welcomes Multilateral Efforts to Improve 
International Tax Compliance and Transparency (July 26, 2012) available at 
http://www.oecd.org/
newsroom/taxoecdwelcomesmultilateraleffortstoimproveinternationaltaxcomplianceandtranspa
rency.htm. In January 2010, the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs created the Treaty 
Relief and Compliance Enhancement (TRACE) Group to: (1) develop efficient treaty relief 
systems “to minimize administrative costs and allocate the costs to the appropriate parties;” 
and (2) identify “solutions that enhance countries’ abilities to ensure proper compliance with 
tax obligations, from the perspective of both source and residence countries.” Treaty Relief 
and Compliance Enhancement (TRACE), OECD, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-
tax-information/aboutthetracegroup.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2013). See also discussion of 
TRACE proposal, infra notes 311–314 and accompanying text. 
 111. Lee Sheppard, United States Sells Europeans on FATCA Intergovernmental 
Agreements, 136 TAX NOTES 1504, 1504 (2012); see also Parillo & Arora, supra note 106. 
 112. Press Release, OECD, supra note 110. The OECD has recently released two reports 
on information exchange. See OECD, Keeping It Safe: The OECD Guide on the Protection of 
Confidentiality of Information Exchanged for Tax Purposes (2012), available at http://www. 
oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/Keeping%20it%20Safe_EN_FINAL_forweb.pdf; 
OECD, Automatic Exchange of Information: What It Is, How It Works, Benefits, What Remains 
to Be Done (2012), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchangeofinformation/AEOI_FINAL_with%20cover _WEB.pdf. 
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information.113 Article 26 sets forth the international standard on 
exchange of information, and new paragraph 5 includes information 
exchange on request, “regardless of bank secrecy and a domestic tax 
interest.”114 Thus, signatories are precluded from refusing to provide 
information solely because the information is held by a bank or a 
trustee.115 
The reciprocal version of Treasury Model I “acknowledges the 
need to achieve equivalent levels of reciprocal automatic information 
exchange” with the FATCA partner and commits to pursue the 
adoption of regulation and support of legislation that would achieve 
this result.116 The U.S. government will only entertain a reciprocal 
IGA with a country where it has determined that the foreign 
government has sufficient safeguards for protecting the 
confidentiality of the information.117 Thus, it was not surprising that 
the first bilateral agreement based on Treasury Model I was signed 
September 12, 2012, with the United Kingdom.118 A similar IGA 
 
 113. OECD, Update to Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention and its 
Commentary, at 5.2 (2012), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchangeofinformation/120718_Article%2026-E
NG_no%20cover%20(2).pdf; see also Lee A. Sheppard, U.S. Sells FATCA IGAs to Europeans, 
68 TAX NOTES INT’L 7, 7 (2012) (stating that the update “require[s] signatories to agree to 
accept group information requests as ‘foreseeably relevant’ under article 26 of their treaties”). 
 114. Press Release, OECD, Tax: OECD Updates OECD Model Tax Convention to 
Extend Information Requests to Groups (July 18, 2012), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/tax
oecdupdatesoecdmodeltaxconventiontoextendinformationrequeststogroups.htm. 
 115. See OECD, Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital 
(2012), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/taxtreaties/article26oftheoecdmodeltaxconventionon
incomeandcapital.htm (explaining that the update “make[s] it clear that a state cannot refuse a 
request for information solely because it has no domestic tax interest in the information or 
solely because it is held by a bank or other financial institution”). 
 116. Treasury Model I, supra note 92, art. 6(1), at 13. 
 117. See Letter from Debbie Wasserman Schultz, U.S. Cong., to Timothy Geithner, U.S. 
Sec’y of the Treas. (July 26, 2012) (on file with author); see also Letter from Timothy 
Geithner, U.S. Sec’y of the Treas., to Debbie Wasserman Schultz, U.S. Cong. (Sept. 11, 
2012), Tax Analyst Doc 2012-19441. 
 118. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury, United Kingdom Sign Bilateral 
Agreement to Improve Tax Compliance, Combat Offshore Tax Evasion and Implement 
FATCA (Sept. 14, 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/tg1711.aspx. It should be noted however, that the UK’s “Rubik” agreement 
with Switzerland, which entered into force on January 1, 2013, is inconsistent with this 
commitment to fiscal transparency. See Pasquale Pistone, Exchange of Information and Rubik 
Agreements: The Perspective of an EU Academic, 67 BULL. INT’L TAX’N 216, 217 (2013) 
(“Rubik agreements . . . clash with the spirit of fiscal transparency.”). 
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was signed with Denmark119 and with Mexico on November 19, 
2012.120 In 2013, France, Germany, Ireland, Norway, and Spain are 
the major countries that have also signed such an agreement.121 
U.K. financial institutions will benefit from due diligence rules 
that resemble the existing anti–money laundering rules122 and 
reporting requirements in lieu of withholding and account 
termination requirements. The U.S.-U.K. FATCA Agreement also 
includes a requirement that the United States grant the U.K. any 
more favorable terms that it might negotiate with another country (a 
most-favored-nation article).123 Annex II, which varies from country 
to country, identifies the entities and products that are exempt from 
FATCA because of the perceived low risk of their use to evade U.S. 
tax.124 For example, retirement plans specifically identified in the 
U.S.-U.K. Annex II “will not be subject to the FATCA due 
diligence, verification, and information collection and reporting 
 
 119. See Agreement to Improve International Tax Compliance and to Implement 
FATCA, U.S.-Den., Nov. 15, 2012, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Agreement-Denmark-11-19-2012.pdf. 
 120. See Mexico IGA, supra note 95; see also Kristen A. Parillo, U.S., Mexico Sign 
FATCA Agreement, Tax Notes Today (Nov. 28, 2012); U.S.-Mexico FATCA Agreement 
Entails Sharing of Taxpayer Identification Numbers, BNA DAILY TAX REP., Nov. 29, 2012, no. 
229, at G-1. 
 121. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2014); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury, Switzerland 
Sign Bilateral Agreement to Improve Tax Compliance, Combat International Tax Evasion and 
Implement FATCA (February 14, 2013), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/tg1853.aspx. Serious negotiations are also underway with many 
other countries such as Jamaica and Bermuda. See, e.g., Steven Jackson, Jamaica, US to Sign 
Agreement on FATCA, THE GLEANER (Kingston, Jamaica), May 10, 2013, available at 
http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20130510/business/business4.html; Bermuda to Sign 
Model IGA 2 for USA and UK FATCA, BDA SUN (Bermuda), Apr. 20, 2013, available at 
http://www.bermudasun.bm/Content/BUSINESS/Business/Article/Bermuda-to-sign-Mo
del-IGA-2-for-USA-and-UK-FATCA/72/205/65971. 
 122. For example, most family trusts are excluded, as these are investment entities that 
are not required to apply UK anti-money laundering rules. See HM Revenue & Customs, 
Implementing the UK-US FATCA Agreement: Consultation Document, ¶ 3.8–9, at 10, Sept. 
18, 2012, available at 
http://customs.hmrc.gov.uk/channelsPortalWebApp/downloadFile?contentID=HMCE_PR
OD1_032308. 
 123. Agreement to Improve International Tax Compliance and to Implement FATCA, 
U.S.-U.K., art. 7, Sept. 12, 2012, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Agreement-UK-9-12-2012.pdf [hereinafter U.K.-U.S. 
Agreement to Implement FATCA]. 
 124. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, supra note 118. 
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requirements” nor will it be subject to “FATCA withholding.”125 In 
August 2013, the U.S. Treasury Department released a revised 
Model I, Annex II that uses a rules-based approach instead of lists.126 
It is expected that in the future, negotiations between the U.S. 
Treasury and other countries will be much more limited, given the 
details provided regarding categories of institutions and products 
deemed compliant or exempt included in Model Annex II.127 
For U.S. purposes, the U.S.-U.K. FATCA Agreement is an 
executive agreement that does not need to be submitted to the 
Senate for approval.128 The United Kingdom, however, will require 
legislation to be put forward in the Finance Bill 2013 process. The 
HM Revenue & Customs has “issued draft regulations and guidance 
indicating how it will implement its obligations under its agreement 
with the United States.”129 Thus, each country that signs such an 
IGA will have discretion as to how to implement it. This is cause for 
concern because financial institutions may end up complying with a 
multitude of requirements that vary from country to country.130 
The U.S.-U.K. Bilateral FATCA Agreement clearly specifies that 
the United States will provide the relevant information with respect 
to U.K. account holders using procedures to be established under 
Article 27 of the U.S.-U.K. Income and Capital Gains Tax 
Convention.131 Unfortunately, there seems to be an acceptance of 
the limitations on the availability of U.S. information. “While 
legislative constraints in the US mean that authorities there are 
unable to collect certain information, most notably with regard to 
entities, they are providing the UK with a broader scope of 
 
 125. Bennett et al., supra note 99, at 1305. 
 126. See Treasury Model I, supra note 92, annex II, at 31. 
 127. Id.; see also 2013 WTD 113-1. 
 128. For a discussion of the controversy over the legal status of IGAs, see Allison 
Christians, Putting the Reign Back in Sovereign, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1373, 1404 (2013) (arguing 
that presenting IGAs “as diplomatic agreements . . . represents a significant expansion of the 
competent authority’s interpretive role”). See also response by Susan Morse, Why FATCA 
Intergovernmental Agreements Bind the U.S. Government, 70 TAX NOTES INT’L 245 (2013). 
 129. See HM Revenue & Customs, supra note 122. 
 130. See generally Jaime Arora, Bank Representatives Discuss FATCA Concerns in Light of 
IGAs, 2012 TAX NOTES TODAY 225-2 (Nov. 21, 2012). 
 131. U.K.-U.S. Agreement to Implement FATCA, supra note 123, art. 2(2)(b); see also 
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with 
Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains, U.S.-U.K, art. 26, at 33–35, July 24, 2001, 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/treaties/Documents/uktreaty.pdf. 
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information on individual accounts than we are providing them.”132 
However, the Agreement does contain a commitment by the U.S. 
Government to support “relevant legislation to achieve such 
equivalent levels of reciprocal automatic exchange.”133 
I anticipate that many countries will seek to take advantage of 
the reciprocal version of Treasury Model I.134 To the extent that 
these agreements are negotiated, multilateral information exchange 
will be enhanced. According to a Treasury official, most prospective 
FATCA partner jurisdictions intend to require reporting on all 
nonresident accounts rather than imposing “a U.S.-specific reporting 
obligation.”135 On April 9, 2013, the finance ministers of France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, and the U.K. agreed on a pilot multilateral 
exchange facility between their countries based on their IGAs with 
the United States in order to “provide a template as to the wider 
multilateral agreement we hope to see in due course.”136 
The IRS is coordinating with foreign governments to standardize 
the international exchange of information process.137 As Pascal Saint 
Amans, head of OECD’s center for Tax Policy and Administration, 
explained, “FATCA is a big catalyst toward an [eventual] multilateral 
platform for automatic information exchange.”138 Furthermore, he 
hopes that FATCA leads more countries to sign the Multilateral 
Convention.139 In fact, at an OECD conference in Cape Town, 
South Africa, in October 2012, the Czech Republic, Malta, and New 
 
 132. Press Release, HM Treasury, UK-US Agreement Strengthens UK Ability to Tackle 
Tax Evasion (Sept. 14, 2012), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-us-
agreement-strengthens-uk-ability-to-tackle-tax-evasion. 
 133. U.K.-U.S. Agreement to Implement FATCA, supra note 123, at art. 6; see also HM 
Treasury, supra note 132. 
 134. See generally Jaime Arora, U.S. Treasury Official to Discuss FATCA Implementation 
in Europe, Asia, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Sept. 19, 2012. 
 135. Marie Sapirie, Finding a Silver Lining in FATCA, 135 TAX NOTES 1551, 1552 
(2012). 
 136. Letter from Pierre Moscovici, Wolfgang Scauble, Vittorio Grilli, Cristobal Montoro 
Romero, and George Osbourne, to Algirdas Semeta, Comm’r for Taxation & Customs Union, 
Audit & Anti-Fraud, Eur. Comm’n [hereinafter Finance Ministers’ Letter] (Apr. 9, 2013), 
available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/g5_letter_to_european_commission_090413.pdf. 
 137. Jaime Arora, Details on FATCA Registration Process Remains Hazy, 68 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 791, 791 (2012). 
 138. Mitchell, supra note 107. 
 139. Id. “[T]he multilateral pact is definitely a piece in the patchwork of many pieces that 
will go into such a platform.” 
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Zealand signed the Multilateral Convention, and Lithuania, Nigeria, 
Gabon, Kazakhstan, and Latvia signed letters of intent to sign the 
Convention.140 It remains to be seen, however, how much automatic 
information will be exchanged on the part of the United States given 
the experience discussed below with respect to the bank deposit 
interest of nonresident account holders. 
III. REGULATIONS ON REPORTING BANK DEPOSIT INTEREST OF 
NONRESIDENTS 
Certain commentators have noted that “[t]he United States is a 
tax haven.”141 The United States has negotiated tax treaties or tax 
information exchange agreements with seventy-nine countries,142 but 
only has meaningful information exchange with Canada.143 Banks 
were not required to automatically report the interest payments 
made to foreign persons unless the U.S. bank deposit interest was 
paid to Canadian residents.144 This resulted in de facto bank 
secrecy.145 
All treaties negotiated since 1974 contain a standard tax 
information exchange article,146 but the U.S.-Canada treaty also 
 
 140. Press Release, OECD, Global Forum on Tax Transparency Welcomes New 
Members and Reviews 12 Countries (Oct. 29, 2012), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/globalforum
ontaxtransparencywelcomesnewmembersandreviews12countries.htm. Further, Romania had 
signed the Multilateral Convention earlier in October while Albania, Belize, Estonia, Morocco, 
and Niue had also recently signed letters of intent to sign the Convention. Id. 
 141. Lee A. Sheppard, FATCA Is a Drone: What to Do About Compliance, 64 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 10, 11 (2011) (“[An] expensive, failed war of choice, Vietnam, prompted the 
United States to set itself up as a tax haven for foreign investors wanting the safety of Treasury 
securities. . . . [Now] [t]he United States is a tax haven for Latin Americans. The government 
will not disclose information to their governments, chiefly Mexico, and conveniently does not 
have information sharing agreements with other important ones, chiefly Brazil and 
Argentina.”); see also Charles Gnaedinger, U.S. Ranks First in Financial Secrecy, 56 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 407, 407 (2009); David Spencer, New U.S. Regs. on Reporting Nonresident Alien 
Bank Deposit Interest, 22 J. INT’L TAX’N 30, 30 (2011). 
 142. See Rev. Proc. 2012-24, 2012-20 I.R.B. 913 (listing seventy-nine “countries with 
which the United States has in effect an income tax or other convention or bilateral agreement 
relating to the exchange of tax information”). 
 143. Robert Goulder, How the U.S. is a Tax Haven for Mexico’s Wealthy, 55 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 695, 695 (2009). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Spencer, supra note 141, at 30, 32. 
 146. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-11-730, Tax Administration: IRS’s 
Information Exchanges with Other Countries Could Be Improved Through Better 
Performance Information, App. IV (2011). 
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contains an “assistance in collection” article147 not found in the U.S. 
Model Treaty. U.S. regulations implemented this treaty obligation 
by requiring bank deposit interest payment information with respect 
to Canadian residents to be collected and reported to the U.S. 
government.148 This information was then shared automatically with 
the Canadian government. Mexico had been asking for a similar 
arrangement to no avail as evidenced by the then Mexican Secretary 
of Finance Agustin Carstens’ letter to U.S. Treasury Secretary 
Geithner on February 9, 2009.149 “[D]ue to the fact that the United 
States does not tax interest income paid by banks to non-resident 
aliens, and both countries do not have a solid and reliable 
mechanism to verify actual residence of foreign depositors, we simply 
are allowing both the tax avoiders and the criminals to move their 
money untaxed.” 
This information had not been available for any other jurisdiction 
besides Canada. Under U.S. international tax law, foreign individuals 
are not subject to tax in the United States on investment income 
unless from sources within the United States.150 Investment income 
is defined as any payment of fixed or determinable annual or 
periodical income such as interest and dividend income.151 However, 
interest earned on most deposits in U.S. banks and other financial 
institutions is exempt from tax even though treated as U.S.-source 
income in order to encourage foreign persons to use U.S. banks.152 
Foreign individuals do not need to have any sort of U.S. taxpayer 
identification number as long as the investment earning interest “is 
not effectively connected with a trade or business” in the United 
 
 147. See Sheppard, supra note 23, at 404; Revised Protocol Amending the Convention 
Between the United States and Canada with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, 
U.S.-Can., Apr. 12, 1995, S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-4. 
 148. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6049-4(a), (b)(1), 1.6049-8 (2012). 
 149. Letter from Agustin Carstens, Mexican Sec’y of Fin., to Timothy Geithner, U.S. 
Sec’y of the Treas. (Feb. 9, 2009), Tax Analysts Doc 2009-5928 (“The exchange of 
information on interest paid by banks will certainly provide us with a powerful tool to detect, 
prevent and combat tax evasion . . . .”). But see infra notes 192–94 for current developments 
with respect to an IGA with Mexico. 
 150. In general, U.S. tax is imposed at a flat rate of thirty percent on the U.S.-source 
passive investment income of nonresident alien individuals. I.R.C. § 871(a) (2012). I will refer 
to nonresident alien individuals as foreign individuals. 
 151. I.R.C. § 871(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 152. I.R.C. § 871(i)(2)(A) (2012). Furthermore, U.S.-source interest from most debt 
obligations is exempt from U.S. tax for foreign individuals pursuant to the “portfolio interest 
exception.” I.R.C. § 871(h) (2012). 
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States.153 Such persons simply provide a form to the U.S. payor to 
claim their exemption from domestic information reporting and 
foreign-person withholding.154 In return, with the exception of 
Canada, the bank then had no obligation to issue any information to 
the IRS. Thus, the government had no information to exchange with 
its other treaty partners.155 
Proposed regulations issued in 2002 modified the regulations by 
requiring reporting of U.S. bank deposit interest paid to residents of 
fifteen countries in addition to Canada.156 After a public hearing on 
December 5, 2002, no action was taken with respect to these 
regulations. On January 7, 2011, these proposed regulations were 
withdrawn and replaced by new proposed regulations.157 
The 2011 proposed regulations extended “the information 
reporting requirement to include bank deposit interest paid to 
nonresident alien individuals who are residents of any foreign 
country.”158 The preamble to these proposed regulations noted the 
“growing global consensus regarding the importance of cooperative 
information exchange for tax purposes.”159 It also noted that this 
change would “further strengthen the United States exchange of 
information program, consistent with adequate provisions for 
reciprocity, usability, and confidentiality in respect of this 
information.”160 Finally, the expansion of the deposit interest 
reporting requirement would “help to improve voluntary compliance 
by U.S. taxpayers by making it more difficult to avoid the U.S. 
information reporting system (such as through false claims of foreign 
status).”161 
 
 153. Spencer, supra note 141, at 32. 
 154. I.R.S., Form W-8BEN, Certificate of Foreign Status of Beneficial Owner for United 
State Tax Withholding (2006); I.R.S., Instructions for Form W-8BEN, at 1. (2006). 
 155. Spencer, supra note 141, at 32. 
 156. See Guidance on Reporting of Deposit Interest Paid to Nonresident Aliens, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 50,386, 50,389 (Aug. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 31). These 
regulations replaced proposed regulations published on January 17, 2001, proclaiming them to 
be “overly broad in requiring annual information reporting with respect to U.S. bank deposit 
interest paid to any nonresident alien.” 67 Fed. Reg. at 50,386–50,387. 
 157. See Guidance on Reporting Interest Paid to Nonresident Aliens, 76 Fed. Reg. 1105, 
1105–1106 (Jan. 7, 2011). 
 158. Id. at 1106. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
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On April 19, 2012, these bank deposit regulations were finalized 
with some changes.162 Starting with payments of interest not 
effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business made in 2013 
from an account maintained at a U.S. office,163 both U.S. and certain 
non-U.S. resident accounts will be uniformly disclosed to the IRS.164 
This will facilitate “the ability of the United States to offer 
cooperative, reciprocal tax information exchange arrangements” with 
designated foreign tax administrations.165 
Representatives of the banking industry had called for the 
withdrawal of these regulations at the public IRS hearing held on 
May 18, 2011, stating that the FATCA legislation was the 
appropriate vehicle to address the issue of U.S. persons establishing 
foreign entities for investment in the United States.166 The Florida 
banking industry speakers predicted a massive outflow of capital to 
other countries, perhaps as much as $100 billion in deposits167 and 
expressed concern that this would lead “to a weakening of bank 
liquidity levels, significantly diminishing lending capacity of U.S. 
banks, and the loss of many U.S. jobs.”168 They also submitted a 
letter from the entire Florida House delegation to the President 
demanding withdrawal of the proposed regulations.169 A survey done 
by the Commissioner for Financial Regulation for the State of 
Florida found that forty-one percent of deposits in south Florida 
state-chartered commercial banks are nonresident alien deposits, of 
 
 162. T.D. 9584, 77 Fed. Reg. 23391-01 (2012). 
 163. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6049-4(b)(5), 1.6049-8(a) (as amended in 2012). 
 164. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6049-4, 1.6049-5, 1.6049-6 (as amended in 2012). 
 165. Proposed Regulations to Require Reporting of Nonresident Alien Deposit Interest 
Income: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Fin. Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. 
Comm. on Financial Services, 112th Cong. 96 (2011) (letter from Sen. Carl Levin to Comm’r 
Douglas H. Shulman) [hereinafter Hearing on Interest Reporting Regulations]. 
 166. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Public Hearing on Proposed 
Regulations 26 CFR Part 31, “Guidance on Reporting Interest Paid to Nonresident Aliens” 
(May 18, 2011), Tax Analysts Doc 2011-10811, at 15 (statement by Francisca Mordi, Vice 
President and Sr. Tax Counsel, American Banker’s Association) [hereinafter Public Hearing 
Transcript]; see also David D. Stewart, IRS Hears of Dire Consequences From Nonresident Alien 
Interest Reporting, 131 TAX NOTES 783 (2011). 
 167. Public Hearing Transcript, supra note 166, at 5 (statement by Alex Sanchez, 
President, and Chief Exec. Officer, Fla. Bankers Ass’n). 
 168. Id. at 3 (statement by Maria Grisel Vega, Bd Member, Treasurer, Fla. Int’l Bankers 
Ass’n (FIBA)). 
 169. See Letter from Bill Posey et al., U.S. Cong., to Barack Obama, President of the 
United States (Mar. 2, 2011), available at http://posey.house.gov/uploadedfiles/irs-
delegationletter-march3-2011.pdf. 
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which twenty-six percent of these are individual deposits. 
Furthermore, ninety percent of deposits in foreign banks in south 
Florida are nonresident alien deposits, of which thirty-one percent of 
these are individual deposits.170 For Latin Americans, the United 
States is an “offshore” tax haven. 
The speaker from the Financial Accountability and Corporate 
Transparency Coalition stressed that recent agreements between 
various governments have demonstrated that bank secrecy is no 
longer allowable as grounds for refusing to exchange information.171 
According to Senator Carl Levin (Chairman of the Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations in the U.S. Senate), the proposed 
regulations would “help detect U.S. taxpayers who are evading U.S. 
taxes by opening U.S. accounts and fraudulently claiming foreign 
status.”172 
Senator Levin strongly recommended that the bank deposit 
regulations also be made applicable to accounts opened by 
corporations, trusts, or other entities that are beneficially owned by 
individuals.173 “[I]f a financial institution knows that the beneficial 
owner of an account is a non-U.S. individual, the financial institution 
should disclose the account to the IRS, even if the account is 
nominally held in the name of a foreign entity.”174 Unfortunately, 
this recommendation was not followed in the final bank deposit 
regulations even though FATCA requires foreign financial 
institutions to report on accounts held by an entity where more than 
ten percent is owned by a U.S. person. Thus, the bank deposit 
reporting rules only apply to the nonbusiness interest on directly 
held bank deposits of certain nonresident individuals.175 
Senators Levin, Grassley, Feinstein and Harkin have reintroduced 
the Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance 
Act (S. 1465), which would, if enacted, ensure that beneficial owners 
of corporations or limited liability companies are disclosed as part of 
 
 170. Public Hearing Transcript, supra note 166, at 8 (statement by Thomas Cardwell, 
Comm’r, State of Fla. Office of Fin. Regulation). 
 171. Id. at 11–12 (Statement by Rebecca Wilkins). 
 172. Hearing on Interest Reporting Regulations, supra note 165, at 96. 
 173. Id. at 99. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See Lee A. Sheppard, Will U.S. Hypocrisy on Information Sharing Continue?, 138 
TAX NOTES 253, 256 (2013) (“[I]n other words, the stupid rich. Because the sophisticated 
rich use corporations and Delaware LLCs, they would not be affected.”). 
DO NOT DELETE 7/14/2014 4:14 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2014 
390 
the incorporation process.176 This bill requires a corporation to 
provide the beneficial owner’s name, address, and a U.S. driver’s 
license or passport number or the information from a non-U.S. 
passport.177 If enacted, the legislation would assist domestic law 
enforcement in detecting, preventing, and punishing terrorism, 
money laundering, and other misconduct involving U.S. 
corporations, as well as bring the United States into compliance with 
international standards issued by the Financial Action Task Force on 
Money Laundering.178 
The preamble to the finalized bank deposit regulations addressed 
the concerns raised that the information might be used 
inappropriately.179 Treasury stressed that information will only be 
exchanged where the United States has been satisfied that the 
“foreign jurisdiction’s legal framework” guarantees the 
confidentiality of the taxpayer information.180 Thus, the finalized 
bank deposit regulations only require reporting of “interest paid to a 
nonresident alien individual resident in a country with which the 
United States has” an information exchange agreement in force.181 
This is extremely unfortunate because from a compliance standpoint 
it is easier for financial institutions to report all interest. Payors of 
course, “may elect to report interest payments to all nonresident 
alien individuals,”182 but financial institutions may not feel that they 
can do so unless mandated by law. As the United States is expecting 
global compliance from foreign financial institutions, U.S. financial 
institutions should be collecting the same information. 
A revenue procedure published at the same time as the bank 
deposit regulations lists the seventy-nine eligible countries and 
 
 176. See Sen. Carl Levin, Senate Floor Statement on the Introduction of the 
Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act (Aug. 1, 2013), available at 
http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/speeches/speech/senate-floor-statement-on-the-
introduction-of-the-incorporation-transparency-and-law-enforcement-assistance-act. The 
previous bill, S.1483, was referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs and hearings were held in the Committee on Foreign Relations on May 
24, 2012. Bill Summary & Status, S. 1483, 112th Cong. (2011–2012). 
 177. Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act, S. 1465, 113th 
Cong. (2013). 
 178. Sen. Carl Levin, supra note 176. 
 179. T.D. 9584, 77 Fed. Reg. at 23392. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 23393. 
 182. Id. 
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territories that have the appropriate agreements to exchange 
information by request.183 These countries must be willing and able 
to reciprocate as well as have effective confidentiality laws and 
practices that ensure the use of the information only for the purposes 
of administering and enforcing their own tax laws.184 In a letter to 
the Secretary of the Treasury, Congresswoman Schultz has asked for 
confirmation that the IRS would not consider exchanging 
information with Venezuela, a country on the list, given its inability 
to meet these criteria.185 Treasury Secretary Geithner confirmed that 
regardless of the existence of an income tax treaty,186 the IRS “will 
not share tax information with another country absent a 
determination that the recipient country has sufficient safeguards in 
place to ensure the proper use of the information and to protect its 
confidentiality.”187 Thus, it appears that taxpayer privacy concerns 
are being adequately safeguarded. 
A second list in the revenue procedure details the countries with 
whom the information will be shared automatically.188 So far, only 
Canada is on this second list, but the IRS has promised to provide 
updates to this revenue procedure.189 Even with such narrow 
applicability of the regulatory changes, a bill passed in July, 2012, by 
the House included an amendment by Rep. Bill Posey of Florida190 
that sought to delay the effective date of the regulations.191 
However, the bank deposit regulatory changes took effect in 2013. 
 
 183. Rev. Proc. 2012-24, supra note 142. 
 184. T.D. 9584, 2012–20 I.R.B. 902. 
 185. See Letter from Debbie Wasserman Schultz, U.S. Cong., to Timothy Geithner, U.S. 
Sec’y of the Treas. (July 26, 2012) (on file with author). 
 186. The U.S. Model Income Tax Convention of Nov. 15, 2006 precludes the disclosure 
of any information that “would be contrary to public policy.” U.S. Treas. Dep’t, United States 
Model Income Tax Convention of November 15, 2006, art. 26, para. (3)(c), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/model006.pdf. 
 187. Geithner Addresses Lawmaker’s Concerns About Security of Nonresident Aliens’ 
Tax Information, Tax Notes Today (Tax Analysts), Doc. 2012-19441 (Sept. 19, 2012), 
available at LEXIS 2012 TNT 182-12. 
 188. Rev. Proc. 2012-24, supra note 142. 
 189. Id. 
 190. H. Amend. 1469, Red Tape Reduction and Small Business Job Creation Act, H.R. 
4078, 112th Cong. (2012). Specifically, the stated purpose of the Amendment by Posey aims, 
“to make it clear that the definition of significant regulatory action would include new 
Treasury regulations regarding non-resident alien deposits.” Id. at Amendment Purpose. 
 191. Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: The Fashion in FATCA Intergovernmental 
Agreements, 136 TAX NOTES 1235, 1238 (2012). 
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Thus, banks must collect information on the interest paid on certain 
deposits held by nonresident alien individuals. 
As discussed earlier, Mexico was the third country to sign an IGA 
with the United States that will require reciprocity in information 
exchange and the only country where the agreement has entered into 
force as of January 1, 2013.192 The IGA with Mexico provides that 
the United States must annually exchange information on 
“Reportable Accounts” on an automatic basis.193 Under the 
agreement, the United States must provide the information that is 
now required to be collected under the bank deposit regulations for 
2013, no later than September 30, 2015.194 The Competent 
Authorities of Mexico and the United States must establish 
procedures for the automatic exchange of such information.195 Thus, 
Mexico will provide the litmus test for U.S. willingness to exchange 
information.196 
FATCA reporting for the 2014 tax year will not be required until 
2015,197 so it is too early to evaluate its effectiveness. However, in 
order for FATCA to work and in light of the various bilateral 
arrangements being undertaken, the IRS must also be able to 
cooperate with foreign tax authorities. Finalizing this bank deposit 
regulation was an important but minor step in global information 
sharing. It “reaffirm[s] U.S. opposition to international tax evasion, 
mak[ing] it clear [that] our country is willing to do its part to stop it, 
and giv[ing] moral force to U.S. efforts to convince other countries 
to share information about U.S. taxpayers with the IRS.”198 IRS 
officials have nevertheless acknowledged that “U.S. rules don’t 
require U.S. financial institutions to provide the exact same 
 
 192. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 193. Mexico IGA, supra note 95, at art. 2, para. 1. 
 194. Id. at arts. 2–3; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6049-4(b)(5). 
 195. Mexico IGA, supra note 95, at art. 3, para. 6 (“The Competent Authorities of 
Mexico and the United States shall enter into an agreement under the mutual agreement 
procedure provided for in Article 5 of the TIEA.”). 
 196. The American Bankers Association has already strongly objected to the “NRA 
reporting automatic exchange provision included in the U.S.-Mexico IGA” in a letter to 
Treasury Secretary Geithner on December 12, 2012. Bankers’ Group Opposes Automatic 
Exchange Provision Under Mexico-U.S. FATCA Agreement, TAX NOTES TODAY (Tax Analysts) 
Doc. 2012-26924 (Jan. 3, 2013), available at LEXIS 2013 TNT 2-14. 
 197. For practical purposes, the regulatory guidance issued has moved the actual 
implementation of FATCA from 2013, as in the statute, to 2014. See FATCA Preamble, supra 
note 24, at 5881. 
 198. Hearing on Interest Reporting Regulations, supra note 165, at 96. 
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information that a foreign institution has to under FATCA.”199 It is 
also a travesty that the bank deposit regulations were knowingly 
finalized with a loophole for entity accounts beneficially owned by 
individuals. Thus, these interest reporting rules will suffer from the 
same problems experienced by the implementation of the European 
Union Savings Directive.200 
III. QUALIFIED INTERMEDIARY PROGRAM AND OTHER TAX 
COMPLIANCE INITIATIVES 
“[T]he United States loses moral leadership on the tax evasion 
issue as long as it has an active program encouraging foreign tax 
cheats to invest in the United States.”201 Professor McIntyre is 
referring to the Qualified Intermediary (QI) program that was 
established in 2001 to ensure that non-U.S. investors paid the 
appropriate amount of U.S. taxes on their U.S.-source investment 
income. The United States imposes a statutory withholding rate of 
thirty percent on U.S.-source portfolio dividends.202 If the beneficial 
owner of the dividend resides in a qualifying treaty country, this rate 
can be reduced as prescribed by the treaty.203 Thus, the banks need 
to know the identity of the client in order to properly withhold. The 
negotiated compromise was effectuated by obtaining QI agreements 
from non-U.S. banks and other financial intermediaries that they 
provide summary information regarding the treaty-based 
withholding positions of their clients without disclosing the identity 
of these foreign account holders.204 
A QI agreement allows a foreign financial institution to maintain 
the confidentiality of its foreign direct account holders, provided 
they fulfill certain withholding and information reporting 
requirements. Banks not signing such QI agreements are required to 
 
 199. Andrew M. Ballard, Full Reciprocity Under FATCA Is a Work in Progress, IRS 
Official Says, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at G-9 (Jan. 28, 2013) (statement of Ted Setzer, 
manager of IRS’s Large Business & International Division). 
 200. See infra Part IV.A. 
 201. Michael J. McIntyre, How to End the Charade of Information Exchange, 56 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 255, 259 (2009). 
 202. I.R.C. § 871 (West Supp. 2013). 
 203. U.S. Treas. Dep’t, United States Model Income Tax Convention of November 15, 
2006, art. 10, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/model006.pdf. 
 204. Susan C. Morse, Ask for Help, Uncle Sam: The Future of Global Tax Reporting, 57 
VILL. L. REV. 529, 532 (2012). 
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collect information from their non-U.S. customers who want a 
reduced withholding rate and to remit “that information up the 
chain of financial institutions and potentially all the way to the 
IRS.”205 QI status also means reduced reporting and documentation 
requirements to receive the lower rate of withholding available under 
an applicable treaty. As Professor Grinberg points out, this program 
“provided one of the conceptual seeds for the anonymous 
withholding approach currently being promoted by Switzerland as a 
means to address residence country tax concerns.”206 
The QI rules define a foreign corporation as a foreign beneficial 
owner.207 This rule allows U.S. account holders to mask their 
identity by making their investments through foreign 
corporations.208 The UBS scandal disclosed that some foreign banks 
were advising their clients to arrange their affairs in this manner.209 
In 2009, the Department of Justice (DOJ) charged UBS, a huge 
bank based in Zurich that has extensive operations in the United 
States, with conspiracy to defraud the United States by enabling 
their U.S. customers to mask “their ownership of, or beneficial 
interest in, income and assets held through offshore accounts in 
Switzerland and other jurisdictions.”210 The DOJ argued that UBS 
assisted as many as 17,000 of its American clients to evade $300 
million a year in taxes through hidden offshore accounts. In order to 
avoid criminal prosecution, UBS agreed to a $780 million fine.211 In 
November, 2010, the bank finalized an agreement under which the 
Swiss government transferred data on approximately 4450 client 
accounts allowing UBS to avoid any further action by the DOJ.212 
 
 205. Grinberg, supra note 12, at 326. 
 206. Id. at 323. 
 207. Treas. Reg. § 1.1441–1(c)(3); see also Morse, supra note 204, at 533. 
 208. Morse, supra note 204, at 533. 
 209. Id. see also J. Richard (Dick) Harvey Jr., Offshore Accounts: Insider’s Summary of 
FATCA and Its Potential Future, 57 VILL. L. REV. 471, 476–79 (2012) (describing the 
problems with the QI system). 
 210. Grinberg, supra note 12, at 315. 
 211. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, UBS Enters into Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement (Feb. 18, 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/February/09-tax-136.html. 
 212. See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation 
on the Request for Information from the Internal Revenue Service of the United States of 
America Regarding UBS AG, a Corporation Established Under the Laws of the Swiss 
Confederation, U.S.-Switz, Aug. 19, 2009, available at http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/pub/irs-
drop/us-swiss_government_agreement.pdf. 
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The IRS responded in part to this scandal by launching an 
amnesty program known as the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure 
Program (OVDP) to encourage people with hidden offshore 
accounts to come forward and get current with respect to their tax 
liabilities.213 Taxpayers who participated in the program had to 
disclose the names of the bankers and others who facilitated opening 
the offshore accounts and establishing shell foreign corporations.214 
In return, the taxpayers were promised that they would avoid civil 
fraud charges, information return non-filing penalties, and criminal 
prosecution, although they would still have to pay back taxes, 
interest, and certain accuracy or delinquency penalties.215 Interest 
was so strong that a second special disclosure initiative was available 
through September 9, 2011.216 Approximately 33,000 people have 
participated in these initiatives since 2009.217 The 2009 and 2011 
programs have generated collections of more than $5 billion in back 
taxes, interest, and penalties.218 
The IRS announced a third version of this program in January, 
2012. This program does not have a deadline for application and the 
terms of the program—including increased penalties—can be altered 
at any time by the Service.219 This is in conjunction with a widening 
 
 213. See Leandra Lederman, The Use of Voluntary Disclosure Initiatives in the Battle 
Against Offshore Tax Evasion, 57 VILL. L. REV. 499, 502–04 (2012) for a history of voluntary 
disclosure programs. 
 214. See IRS Releases FAQ on Voluntary Disclosure Program for Offshore Accounts, TAX 
NOTES TODAY, May 7, 2009, at 86-14. 
 215. Id. 
 216. “Due to . . . Hurricane Irene, the IRS on Aug. 26 extended the due date for 
offshore voluntary disclosure initiative (OVDI) requests until Sept. 9, 2011.” I.R.S., 2011 
Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative, 
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=234900,00.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2013). 
“The first special voluntary disclosure program closed with 15,000 voluntary disclosures on 
Oct. 15, 2009.” I.R.S. News Release IR-2011-14 (Feb. 8, 2011), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Second-Special-Voluntary-Disclosure-Initiative-Opens;-Those-
Hiding-Assets-Offshore-Face-Aug.-31-deadline. 
 217. I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-64 (June 26, 2012), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/ IRS-Says-Offshore-Effort-Tops-$5-Billion,-Announces-New-
Details-on-the-Voluntary-Disclosure-Program-and-Closing-of-Offshore-Loophole. 
 218. Id.; see also McMahon Remarks, supra note 7. 
 219. See Lee Sheppard, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Swiss Behavioral Patterns, 66 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 7, 7 (2012); Marie Sapirie, IRS Announces Third Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program, 
134 TAX NOTES 276 (2012); I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-5 (Jan. 9, 2012), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Offshore-Programs-Produce-$4.4-Billion-To-Date-for-
Nation’s-Taxpayers;-Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Program-Reopens; see also Lederman, 
supra note 213, at 517–27 for an excellent analysis of the program. 
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investigation of foreign banks, including banks in Switzerland, 
Liechtenstein, Israel, and other foreign jurisdictions.220 These 
offshore probes by the IRS are increasing as four thousand 
professionals from its Criminal Investigation division have been 
stationed abroad across ten countries, with plans to expand this 
international presence.221 An increasing number of banks are turning 
over client information to the United States voluntarily, by Court 
order or because of Treaty obligations. Although the penalties for 
the 2012 program have been raised to 27%, this is “less than the 50% 
penalty that the IRS has been imposing in recent criminal tax 
fraud prosecutions.”222 
The fallout of the UBS scandal continues. In the fall of 2011, the 
Swiss Government ordered Credit Suisse to release certain wealthy 
American clients’ account data.223 The IRS requested, pursuant to 
the 1996 United States–Switzerland Tax Convention, that the Swiss 
Federal Tax Administration assist in locating U.S. account holders 
that the IRS had identified, in some cases through the Offshore 
Voluntary Disclosure Programs. However, on April 5, 2012, the 
Federal Administrative Court in Bern upheld an appeal of one of 
these clients and determined that Credit Suisse did not have to 
comply.224 On July 9, 2012, the IRS filed a new more detailed treaty 
request for information.225 The IRS has also announced that 
taxpayers failing to notify the DOJ of any challenges to this 
 
 220. William M. Sharp Sr., Larry R. Kemm & William T. Harrison III, The 2012 Offshore 
Voluntary Disclosure Program: Analysis, Insight, and Intrigue, 67 TAX NOTES INT’L 681, 684 
(2012). For example, the Justice Department asked for assistance under the Liechtenstein-U.S. 
Tax Information Exchange Agreement for information on undeclared accounts at the 
Liechtensteinische Lanndesbanke AG on May 11, 2012. Id.; see also Laura Saunders, Israeli 
Tax Preparers Snared, WALL ST. J. (June 17, 2012, 7:38 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303410404 5
77468901036376714.html. 
 221. John Herzfeld, Charges Expected from Offshore Probes Outside of Switzerland, IRS 
Official Says, BNA DAILY TAX REP. No. 202, at G-7 (Oct. 19, 2012). 
 222. Asher Rubinstein, The IRS Offensive Against Offshore Accounts: New Attacks and 
New Relief, ASSETLAWYER.COM, http://www.assetlawyer.com/irs-offensive-against-offshore-a
ccounts. htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2013). 
 223. David Jolly, Credit Suisse to Turn Over Data on Some U.S. Accounts, 
DEALBOOK,Nov. 8, 2011, 11:31 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/credit-
suisse-to-turn-over-data-on-some-u-s-accounts/. 
 224. David Jolly, Swiss Court Ruling Hampers a Tax Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2012, at 
B5. 
 225. Kristen A. Parillo & Marie Sapirie, I.R.S. Submits New Treaty Request to Switzerland 
on Credit Suisse Data, 136 TAX NOTES 770 (2012). 
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disclosure of tax information in foreign courts will be ineligible for 
participation in the OVDP.226 
As discussed previously, Switzerland has negotiated a FATCA 
Cooperation Agreement that will allow its foreign financial 
institutions to report directly to the U.S. government.227 Pursuant to 
this agreement, all new U.S. accounts must consent to disclosure.228 
Furthermore, the agreement will require Switzerland to promptly 
honor group information requests from the U.S. Competent 
Authority based on the aggregate information reported to the 
IRS.229 Unfortunately, this requirement does not become 
operational until the Swiss Protocol to the 1996 United States–
Switzerland Tax Convention that was signed on September 23, 
2009, enters into force.230 The U.S. Senate must ratify this Protocol 
without further delay for the Swiss FATCA Cooperation Agreement 
to be fully effective. 
On February 2, 2012, private Swiss bank Wegelin was indicted 
for conspiring to conceal more than $1.2 billion in U.S. taxpayer 
funds. Many clients had moved their undeclared accounts from UBS 
to Wegelin.231 On January 3, 2013, Wegelin pled guilty in U.S. 
District Court in Manhattan to assisting wealthy American taxpayers 
evade taxes and will pay $74 million in restitution, fines, and 
forfeiture proceeds to the United States.232 The United States is 
continuing to pressure foreign banks, bank officials, asset managers, 
and attorneys.233 The U.S. government has successfully prosecuted 
 
 226. I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-64, supra note 217. 
 227. Swiss FATCA Cooperation Agreement, supra note 81; see also Sheppard, supra note 
113, at 7. 
 228. Swiss FATCA Cooperation Agreement, supra note 81, at art. 3(1)(c); see also J. 
Richard Harvey, FATCA—A Report From the Front Lines, 136 TAX NOTES 713 (2012). 
 229. Swiss FATCA Cooperation Agreement, supra note 81, at art. 5(1); see also Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, supra note 69. 
 230. Swiss FATCA Cooperation Agreement, supra note 81, at art. 5(1). 
 231. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Swiss Bank Indicted on U.S. Tax Charges (Feb. 
2, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/tax/2012/txdv12153.htm. 
 232. Peter Lattman, Swiss Bank Pleads Guilty to Helping American Tax Dodgers, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 4, 2013, at B5. The private bank will close once these matters are settled. Chad 
Bray, Swiss Bank Pleads Guilty in Probe—Wegelin & Co. Admits It Helped Americans Avoid 
Taxes with Secret Accounts, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 4, 2013), at C2. 
 233. See Asher Rubinstein, Offshore Update: Continued Investigation and Prosecution of 
Foreign Accounts Amidst a New Opportunity for Pre-emptive Disclosure, ASSETLAWYER.COM 
(Jan. 19, 2012, 9:57 PM), http://www.assetlawyer.com/wordpress/?p=1170 (“Negotiations 
are currently underway between the U.S. and Switzerland for a global settlement that will 
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approximately fifty criminal tax evasion cases including negotiating a 
$22 million payment from Mary Estelle Curran for filing false returns 
and evading $668,000 in taxes on the $40 million secret bank 
account left by her husband.234 Clients are being advised to come 
forward as “[i]n light of the erosion of foreign banking secrecy, 
discovery of the account by the IRS is very likely.”235 So in effect, 
FATCA has already started working as the fear of bank disclosure is 
encouraging taxpayers to disclose first. 
IV. EUROPEAN UNION INITIATIVES 
A. European Union Savings Directive 
With the liberalization of capital movements, both within the 
European Union and with respect to third countries, it became 
necessary “to ensure a minimum level of taxation on interest 
income.”236 After years of negotiations, the Savings Directive 
(“EUSD”) finally took effect in the Member States in 2005.237 
Because of certain bilateral agreements, the Directive also impacts 
jurisdictions such as Jersey, Guernsey, and the Cayman Islands.238 
Equivalent measures are also applied to five European non-EU 
countries: Switzerland, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Monaco, and 
Andorra.239 The goal of the EUSD is to ensure effective taxation by 
the beneficial owner’s state of residence of the interest payments 
made to the individual from another Member State. This is enabled  
 
 
involve all Swiss banks.”) [hereinafter Rubinstein]. 
 234. Laura Saunders, U.S. is Preparing More Tax-Evasion Cases, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 
2013), at C1. 
 235. Rubinstein, supra note 233. “If the banker is then criminally charged, the banker is 
likely to cooperate with prosecutors and divulge bank account information as part of a 
negotiated settlement. For instance, Renzo Gadola, a former UBS banker in Switzerland was 
charged with facilitating US tax fraud. He pled guilty in December 2010 and has been 
cooperating with DOJ prosecutors. He has provided information about U.S. clients and other 
Swiss bankers who assisted in hiding foreign assets. As part of Gadola’s settlement, he must 
return to the U.S. annually to further assist DOJ investigations of foreign banking.” Id. 
 236. Sabine Heidenbauer, The Savings Directive, in INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN TAX 
LAW: DIRECT TAXATION 167, 168 (Michael Lang et al. eds., 2d ed. 2010). 
 237. Savings Directive, supra note 6. 
 238. See Jens Schroder, Savings Taxation and Banking Secrecy, in EXCHANGE OF 
INFORMATION AND BANK SECRECY 59, 60 (Alexander Rust & Eric Fort eds., 2012) (the “10 
dependent or associated territories of the Netherlands and the UK”). 
 239. Id. at 62–63. 
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by the automatic exchange of information between tax 
administrations on the individual’s interest income.240 
However, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Austria, instead of 
exchanging information automatically, were obliged only to “levy a 
withholding tax at a rate of 15% during the first three years of the 
transitional period, 20% for the subsequent three years and 35% 
thereafter.”241 These “banking havens” negotiated the choice 
between identifying customers or withholding tax,242 claiming that 
they would be at a competitive disadvantage unless other 
jurisdictions such as Switzerland and the United States agreed to the 
“exchange of information upon request as defined in the OECD 
Model Agreement . . . with respect to interest payments.”243 This 
transition rule allowed Austria, Belgium, and Luxembourg to apply a 
“withholding tax to the savings income without having to divulge 
details on individual clients or their income earned to the tax 
authorities.”244 Belgium began participating in the automatic 
exchange of information as of January 1, 2010, but Austria and 
Luxembourg continue to withhold at the thirty-five percent rate.245 
Luxembourg, however, has agreed to begin participating in the 
automatic exchange of information within the European Union as of 
January 1, 2015.246 
The Commission proposed amendments to the EUSD in 2008 
in order to close loopholes and to ameliorate tax evasion.247 The 
 
 240. Savings Directive, supra note 6, art. 1, at 39. 
 241. Id. art. 11, at 43. Seventy-five percent of the revenues are transferred to the 
residence state of the investor. Schroder, supra note 238, at 62. 
 242. Sheppard, supra note 23. 
 243. Savings Directive, supra note 6, art. 10, at 43. 
 244. Charles-Henry Courtois, The Impact of the European Commission on the Council of 
Ministers’ Decisions in the Field of European Taxation: The Case of the European Savings 
Directive, 2 INT’L PUB. POL’Y REV., no. 2, Nov. 2006, at 33. 
 245. Schroder, supra note 238, at 62; see also European Commission, Rules Applicable, 
(Sept. 26, 2013, 11:03 PM)), 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/personal_tax/savings_tax/rules
_applicable/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2013). 
 246. Ian Wishart, Luxembourg agrees to tax-exchange legislation, EUROPEANVOICE.COM 
(Apr. 4, 2013), www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/luxembourg-agrees-to-tax-
exchange-legidlation/76912.aspx; see also European Commission Backs Luxembourg on its 
Efforts to End Banking Secrecy, BNA DAILY TAX REP., Apr. 9, 2013, No. 68, at I-1. 
 247. Press Release, European Comm’n., Taxation of Savings: The European Commission 
Proposes Changes to Eliminate Tax Evasion, (Nov. 12, 2008), IP/08/1697, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1697. László Kovács, 
Commissioner for Taxation and Customs, said: “The first report on the operation of the 
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amendments are intended to ensure the taxation of interest payments 
that are routed through intermediate tax-exempt structures such as 
foreign trusts as well as to extend the scope of the Savings Directive 
to other interest income from certain financial and insurance 
products.248 The Savings Directive requires that the Commission 
evaluate its performance every three years.249 The Commission’s 
initial reports had found that the EUSD’s definitions of interest, 
paying agent, and beneficial owner were deficient in fulfilling the 
goal of effective taxation.250 The second mandated review reported 
that between the years 2000 and 2010, an average of thirty-five 
percent of non-bank deposits in Member States and applicable 
jurisdictions are held by untaxed offshore structures that are being 
used to hide the actual beneficial owner.251 The report also 
documented a substantial increase in the sale of structured 
financial products.252 
In June 2009, the EU Finance Ministers announced 
recommendations agreed to by all twenty-seven Member States for 
strengthening the Savings Taxation Directive.253 In March 2011, 
ECOFIN published a revised proposal that took into account 
concerns expressed by various Member States as well as the opinions 
of the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social 
 
Savings Taxation Directive concluded that the Directive, although effective within the limits of 
its scope, can be easily circumvented. The current scope of the Directive needs to be extended, 
in order to meet our goal of stamping out tax evasion, which affects the national budgets and 
creates disadvantages for the honest citizens.” Id. 
 248. See Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Directive 
Amending Directive 2003/48/EC on Taxation of Savings Income in the Form of Interest 
Payments, at 2–3, COM (2008) 727 final (Nov. 2008), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resour
ces/documents/taxation/personal_tax/savings_tax/savings_directive_review/com(2008)727
_en.pdf [hereinafter Proposal for Savings Directive Amendments]. 
 249. Savings Directive, supra note 6, at art. 18, at 45. 
 250. Proposal for Savings Directive Amendments, supra note 248, at 2. 
 251. See European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council in 
Accordance with Article 18 of Council Directive 2003/48/EC on Taxation of Savings Income 




 252. Id. at 10–11. 
 253. Charles Gnaedinger, ECOFIN Agrees on Approach to Improve Savings Tax Directive, 
54 TAX NOTES INT’L 921, 922 (2009). 
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Committee.254 Discussions are ongoing.255 In its 2012 
Communication on Tax Evasion, the Commission urged the 
adoption of the revisions to the Savings Directive in order to put the 
EU “in a stronger position to seek equivalent improvements from 
other countries.”256 
The EU leaders are trying to negotiate a tax transparency deal 
that would update the Savings Directive in order to close loopholes 
and to ameliorate tax evasion. The European Commission estimates 
that tax evasion is costing Member States approximately one trillion 
euros annually ($1.3 trillion).257 The amendments are intended to 
ensure the taxation of interest payments that are routed through 
intermediate tax-exempt structures such as foreign trusts as well as to 
extend the scope of the Savings Directive to other interest income 
from certain financial products and insurance products.258 
The European Commission had been hoping to convince the 
United States to piggyback onto its approach with respect to third 
countries. Unfortunately, objections by Austria and Luxembourg 
with respect to the proposed revision of the EU Savings Directive 
have hindered such a result.259 The Commission has issued a 
statement applauding the “coordinated bilateral agreements” being 
negotiated with the United States, noting that it could, at a later 
stage, form the foundation for wider cooperation on information 
 
 254. Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Council Directive Amending 
Directive 2003/48/EC on Taxation of Savings Income in the Form of Interest Payments, CNS 
(2008) (Mar. 4, 2011), available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st06/st06946.en11.pdf. 




 256. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
on Concrete Ways to Reinforce the Fight Against Tax Fraud and Tax Evasion Including in 
Relation to Third Countries, at 7, COM (2012) 351 final (June 27, 2012) [hereinafter 
Communication on Tax Evasion]. 
 257. European Commission, EU gets tough on tax evasion—11/12/2012, 
http://ec.europa.eu /news/economy/121211_en.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2014). 
 258. Communication on Tax Evasion, supra note 256, at 6–7. 
 259. Bruce Zagaris, Bilateral Agreement Alternative to FATCA Implementation Brings 
New Twist to International Tax Cooperation, 28 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 113 (2012); see 
also Pistone, supra note 118, at 221 (noting that Austria and Luxembourg want to preserve 
the symmetry between the Savings Directive and the external agreements to avoid any 
competitive disadvantage). 
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exchange between the EU and the United States.260 The hope is that 
this cooperation will lead to progress in the “EU’s efforts to promote 
global application of the automatic exchange of information for tax 
purposes.”261 
The Commission had asked for a mandate to allow it to 
negotiate amendments to the existing savings agreements with 
Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, and Switzerland that 
would align these agreements with the new standards for 
information exchange.262 Certain Member States—under pressure 
from their prominent financial institutions—had resisted, not 
wanting to further the automatic exchange of information regime.263 
Instead, Germany and the United Kingdom began their own 
negotiations with Switzerland.264 The German and British tax 
cooperation agreements signed with Switzerland in 2011 (known as 
the Rubik agreements) were challenged as being incompatible with 
the current EU-Switzerland Savings Agreement in part because they 
would have allowed a lower rate of withholding tax than the thirty-
five percent rate currently imposed and applied to interest income 
already covered by the EU-Swiss Savings Agreement.265 Germany 






 260. European Commission, Commission Welcomes US Move to Ensure Enhanced 
International Tax Cooperation in a More Business-Friendly Way, MEMO/12/88 (Brussels, 
Feb. 8, 2012); see also Bennett, supra note 58. 
 261. Tanguy Verhoosel, FATCA: Five EU States Work Out Compromise with Washington, 
EUROPOLITICS (Feb. 09, 2012), http://www.europolitics.info/external-policies/fatca-five-
eu-states-work-out-compromise-with-washington-art325662-44.html. 
 262. Communication on Tax Evasion, supra note 256, at 10. 
 263. See generally Kaspar Villiger, Chairman of the Board of Directors of UBS AG, 
Annual General Meeting (May 3, 2012), in UBS Chair Warns Against Tax Information 
Exchange Requirements, 66 TAX NOTES INT’L 753, 756 (2012). 
 264. Francesco Carelli, The New Tax Agreement Between Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom—An Analysis, 52 EUR. TAX’N 301 (June 2012). 
 265. Id. at 301, 305; see also Agreement Between the European Community and the 
Swiss Confederation Providing for Measures Equivalent to Those Laid Down in Council 
Directive 2003/48/EC on Taxation of Savings Income in the Form of Interest Payments, 
2004 O.J. (385) 30, available at http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/downloadFile.do? 
fullText=yes&treatyTransId=567 (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).  
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objections.266 However, not all commentators believe that all 
inconsistencies have been overcome.267 
These Rubik agreements are extraordinarily complex with unique 
mathematical formulas to calculate final withholdings on previously 
untaxed assets in Switzerland as well as the future investment income 
that they produce.268 Germany and the United Kingdom were to 
receive a guaranteed CHF 2 billion and CHF 500 million 
respectively because of the untaxed assets held in Switzerland with 
further payments expected to surpass CHF 4 billion and CHF 1.3 
billion, an indication of the seriousness of the tax evasion problem in 
Europe.269 The Swiss-UK agreement entered into force on January 
1, 2013. However, the Swiss-German agreement was rejected by the 
German Bundesrat (Upper House) on November 23, 2012, as not 
being compatible with Germany’s international obligations or 
national policy.270 
Austria signed its own agreement with Switzerland on April 13, 
2012, which entered into force on January 1, 2013.271 Reportedly, 
negotiations are also taking place with Italy, Greece, and Belgium.272 
Although intended to establish cooperation equivalent to the 
 
 266. Randall Jackson, EU Accepts Swiss Tax Agreements with Germany, U.K., 66 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 314 (2012); HM Revenues & Customs, UK-Swiss Confederation Taxation 
Cooperation Agreement, Oct. 6, 2011, available at 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/taxtreaties/ukswiss.htm [hereinafter Switz-UK Agreement]; 
Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and 
Capital, Ger.-Switz., Oct. 27, 2011; Protocol to the Swiss-German Agreement, Apr. 20, 2012; 
Protocol to the Swiss-UK Agreement, Mar. 20, 2012, available at 
www.hmrc.gov.uk/taxtreaties/swiss-uk-letters.pdf; see also BBC, Tax Evasion Treaty Signed by 
Switzerland and Germany, (Apr. 5, 2012, 08:31 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
17624364. 
 267. Pistone, supra note 118, at 221–24 (asserting that the protocols to the Rubik 
agreements do not resolve the problem). 
 268. Carelli, supra note 264, at 302–03. This payment can be avoided by authorizing full 
disclosure to the UK authorities. See Switz-UK Agreement, supra note 266, art. 10. 
 269. Communication on Tax Evasion, supra note 256, at 10. 
 270. Pistone, supra note 118, at 218; see also Rolf Eicke, The Germany-Switzerland 
Withholding Tax Agreement: Stalled for Good?, 68 TAX NOTES INT’L 191, (2012) (noting that 
because of domestic political pressures in Germany, it appears that the agreement between 
Germany and Switzerland may not be enacted). 
 271. See Stefanie Steiner & Christian Wimpissinger, Thoughts on the New Austria-
Switzerland Tax Agreement, 66 TAX NOTES INT’L 412 (2012). 
 272. See Marc Quaghebeur, Switzerland and Belgium Discuss Withholding Agreement, 67 
TAX NOTES INT’L 1091 (2012) (“Switzerland is also negotiating Rubik agreements with 
Greece and Italy.”). 
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automatic exchange of information,273 Professor Grinberg rightly 
points out that these agreements are troubling as more and more 
countries relinquish their tax sovereignty.274 Not every country will 
be able to negotiate such an agreement with Switzerland, and the 
terms will reflect the bargaining power of the nation. Note that 
Austria was not able to negotiate any guaranteed revenues from 
Switzerland. 
Professor Pistone laments that the Rubik agreements harm 
global fiscal transparency by reducing “cross-border flows of 
information and provid[ing] a shelter for tax opacity.”275 The 
agreements provide that those individuals who close their accounts 
before the expected entry into force date of January 1, 2013 will be 
unaffected.276 However, Switzerland will collect data on the 
destination of funds withdrawn from the country following the 
announcement of the agreement with the United Kingdom, and will 
share that data—for the top ten jurisdictions that funds have moved 
to as well as the number of “relevant persons” who have transferred 
assets to each of the ten jurisdictions—with the United Kingdom.277 
The Liechtenstein-UK agreement provides another model for 
addressing the offshore tax evasion problem, the Liechtenstein 
Disclosure Facility (LDF). Since 2009, Liechtenstein has been 
offering a taxpayer assistance program to UK taxpayers to help them 
declare their Liechtenstein investments to HMRC.278 Any UK 
taxpayer that cannot prove that they are UK tax compliant must 
participate in registration and disclosure or move their assets to 
another jurisdiction. The penalties (ten percent penalty on the 
underpaid liabilities) are much lower than the Offshore Voluntary 
 
 273. Switz-UK Agreement, supra note 266, at art. 1. The objective of this Agreement is 
to exchange information about certain individuals “on an automatic basis.” Id. 
 274. Jurisdictions relying on anonymous withholding are placing some of their resources 
in the hands of the other sovereign state. Grinberg, supra note 12, at 361. Whereas 
anonymous withholding reduces policy flexibility and sovereign authority, information 
reporting preserves sovereign policy autonomy. Id. at 364. 
 275. Pistone, supra note 118, at 217. (The Rubik agreements “clash with the spirit of 
fiscal transparency and are an inappropriate way to reconcile the basic right to confidentiality 
with the global effort against tax evasion.”) Id. 
 276. See, e.g., Carelli, supra note 264, at 302. 
 277. Switz-UK Agreement, supra note 266, at Art. 18. 
 278. See HM Revenue & Customs, Liechtenstein Disclosure Facility: Frequently Asked 
Questions (FAQs), (Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/disclosure/liechtenstein-
faq.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2013). 
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Disclosure program of the United States. Other special terms include 
no criminal prosecution and an option to either use a composite tax 
rate of forty percent or to calculate the actual tax liability on an 
annual basis.279 
Will the signing of FATCA agreements by various Member 
States with the United States stem the tide of these alternative 
arrangements? These single country agreements do nothing to 
prevent future tax evaders from seeking to hide their assets and 
income in jurisdictions with which their country has not negotiated 
such an arrangement. Even current evaders do not have much of a 
disincentive to move their assets to other tax haven jurisdictions to 
avoid complying with the agreements. However, even Luxembourg 
is negotiating an IGA with the United States that would allow it to 
share information with the IRS regarding bank accounts held in 
Luxembourg by U.S. citizens and residents. 
As one of the largest financial centers relying on bank secrecy 
laws, Luxembourg has been intensely pressured to step up 
enforcement on tax evasion. As previously discussed, Luxembourg 
has pledged to participate in automatic exchange of information 
within the EU beginning in 2015, a move necessary if it will be 
sharing information with the United States.280 An effective FATCA 
regime will put pressure on Austria to relinquish its use of the 
transitional withholding rule available to it in the Savings Directive. 
It is also possible that FATCA will provide the necessary impetus for 
finalizing the amendments necessary to make the Savings Directive 
function as it was intended. Although the EU Finance Ministers 
failed to approve the Savings Directive amendments at their May 
2013 meeting, they did give the Commission the mandate to 
negotiate updated savings tax agreements with Switzerland, 
Liechtenstein, Monaco, Andorra, and San Marino.281 As stated in the 
Commission’s June 2012 Communication on Tax Evasion, “[r]ecent 
developments at [the] international level as regards the US Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) open new perspectives for 
 
 279. Id. 
 280. Wishart, supra note 246. 
 281. Ian Wishart, Finance Ministers Fail to Reach Deal on Tax Avoidance, 
EUROPEANVOICE.COM (May 14, 2013), 
www.europeanvoice.com/article/2013/may/finance-ministers-fail-to-reach-deal-on-tax-
avoidance/77227.aspx. See also Press Release, Council of the European Union, Economic and 
Financial Affairs (May 14, 2013), at 2. 
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strengthening automatic information exchange between Member 
States and third countries thus improving transparency at a global 
level.”282 
B. 2011 Exchange of Information Directive 
Progress toward administrative cooperation was accelerated by 
the global financial crisis that highlighted the need for more effective 
exchange of information to combat tax avoidance and tax evasion.283 
In February of 2009, the European Commission proposed a new 
council directive on administrative cooperation in the field of 
taxation, which set up procedures, scope, and conditions for the 
exchange of information on request, the automatic exchange of 
information, spontaneous exchange of information, and 
administrative notification among Member States and between 
Member States and third countries.284 One goal was to implement 
the OECD Standard on exchange of information that is set forth in 
Article 26 of the OECD Model Convention.285 
After difficult negotiations, this proposal was formally adopted by 
the Council in 2011 and generally became effective January 1, 
2013.286 The 2011 Exchange of Information Directive is intended to 
apply to all taxes except for those specifically listed and to all 
taxpayers including both natural and legal persons.287 The 2011 
Directive allows the information to be “used for the administration 
and enforcement of the domestic [tax] laws” as well as associated 
judicial and administrative proceedings.288 Member States must 
provide the required information within certain time limits (two 
months for information they already possess and six months for 
other information)289 and are obligated to provide the information 
 
 282. Communication on Tax Evasion, supra note 256, at 11. 
 283. See Irma Johanna Mosquera Valderrama, EU and OECD Proposals for International 
Tax Cooperation: A New Road?, 59 TAX NOTES INT’L 609 (2010). 
 284. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on Administrative Cooperation in the 
Field of Taxation, COM (2009) 29 final (Feb. 2, 2009). 
 285. Press Release, Council of the European Union, Economic and Financial Affairs 
(June 9, 2009), at 23. 
 286. Directive 2011/16 of the Council on Administrative Cooperation in the Field of 
Taxation and Repealing Directive 77/799/EEC, 2011 O.J. (L 64/1) (EU) [hereinafter 2011 
Exchange of Information Directive]. 
 287. Id. at arts. 2, 3(11). 
 288. Id. at art. 16. 
 289. Id. at art. 7(1). 
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even if they do not need it for their own tax purposes and even if 
held by a bank or other financial institution.290 This means that 
Member States cannot justify refusing to provide information on the 
basis of their banking secrecy laws.291 However, this provision is not 
retroactive.292 
Commentators note that the articles on exchange of information 
on request conceivably go beyond the OECD Standard in its 
obligation to transmit any “information that is foreseeably relevant 
to the administration and enforcement of the domestic [tax] laws” 
because the requirements for a valid request are less onerous than 
those in the OECD Model Agreement on the Exchange of 
Information on Tax Matters.293 The most important feature, 
however, is the extension of the mandatory automatic exchange of 
information that exists with respect to savings income to income 
from employment, director’s fees, certain life insurance products, 
pensions, and immovable property to the extent that information is 
available.294 Although the article prescribing the automatic exchange 
of information does not take effect until January 1, 2015, it will 
cover tax periods beginning January 1, 2014.295 
It is generally understood that the automatic exchange of 
information is the most effective way to fight tax evasion. Thus, the 
Directive provided that automatic information exchange may be 
extended to other categories of income such as dividends, capital 
gains, and royalties in the future.296 The Commission is developing 
computerized formats for the income covered by the 2011 Exchange 
of Information Directive so that secure automatic exchange of 
information can be implemented within the EU and is assessing the 
efficacy of a European Tax Identification Number for taxpayers 
engaged in cross-border activity.297 
 
 290. Id. at art. 18. 
 291. Marius Vascega & Servaas van Thiel, Assessment of Taxes in Cross-Border Situations: 
The New EU Directive on Administrative Cooperation in the Field of Taxation, 20 EC TAX REV. 
148, 152 (2011). 
 292. 2011 Exchange of Information Directive, supra note 286, at art. 18(3). 
 293. See Vascega, supra note 282, at 152–53; see also 2011 Exchange of Information 
Directive, supra note 286, at arts. 1, 20. 
 294. 2011 Exchange of Information Directive, supra note 286, at art. 8. 
 295. Id. at arts. 8, 29. 
 296. Id. at pmbl. ¶ 10, art. 8(5). 
 297. Communication on Tax Evasion, supra note 256, at 7. 
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One interesting innovation in the Directive is the addition of a 
most-favored-nation clause such that no Member State may refuse to 
extend its wider cooperation arrangements with third countries to 
another “Member State wishing to enter into such mutual wider 
cooperation.”298 One question is what effect the FATCA agreements 
worked out with respect to various Member States will have with 
respect to cooperation within the EU? Will the increased exchange of 
information with the United States serve to accelerate the timetable 
for the automatic exchange of information between the Member 
States? Legally, any Member State has the right to demand from 
another Member State the same level of cooperation that is being 
provided to the United States. Thus, on June 12, 2013, the 
Commission proposed an extension of mandatory automatic 
information exchange to dividends, capital gains, other financial 
income and account balances as of January 1, 2015 for information 
from the 2014 tax year.299 The Commission acknowledged that the 
IGAs that many Member States have concluded or will conclude 
with the United States with regard to FATCA “have given further 
impetus to [automatic exchange of information] as a way of 
combating tax fraud and evasion.”300 If adopted, there will be 
substantial overlap with the information required by FATCA. 
The finance ministers of the EU’s five largest economies are 
calling for Europe to “take a lead in promoting a global system of 
automatic information exchange” by implementing the Information 
Exchange Directive and effectively applying its most favored nation 
clause.301 I am hopeful that this constitutes the positive fallout from 
the implementation of FATCA. 
 
 298. 2011 Exchange of Information Directive, supra note 286, at art. 19; see also 
Valderrama, supra note 283, at 614. 
 299. See Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive 
2011/16/EU as Regards Mandatory Automatic Exchange of Information in the Field of 




 300. Id. at 3. 
 301. Finance Ministers’ Letter, supra note 136. 
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V. PROPOSALS 
Professor Grinberg persuasively argues that anonymous 
withholding erodes sovereign policy flexibility and “institutionalizes 
differentiated treatment of the most sophisticated taxpayers from the 
rest of society,” thereby undermining domestic tax morale.302 He 
critiques the argument that anonymous withholding is less expensive 
and more administratively feasible than automatic information 
reporting,303 given that a multilateral anonymous withholding system 
following “the Swiss model must (1) . . . identify taxpayers’ country 
of residence, (2) collect information about amounts of interest, 
dividends, capital gains, and other income . . ., (3) determine which 
financial institutions are included in the withholding system,” and 
“(4) ensure financial institutions comply” with the taxpayer 
identification and withholding requirements.304 Cross-border 
information reporting, on the other hand, undergirds tax morale and 
strengthens the capacity to govern particularly for less powerful 
sovereigns.305 Accessible to all countries,306 Professor Grinberg posits 
that the amended Multilateral Convention307 provides a multilateral 
framework for establishing such an automatic transnational tax 
information exchange. The 2010 “protocol incorporates the 
internationally accepted standards for the exchange of foreseeably 
relevant information regardless of bank secrecy” and requires 
signatories to accept requests with respect to “ascertainable groups 
 
 302. Grinberg¸ supra note 12, at 347. 
 303. Id. at 351. 
 304. Id. at 351–52. Only the information reporting requirement for taxpayer 
identification numbers (TINs) is more burdensome than anonymous withholding 
requirements. Id. at 352. 
 305. Id. at 347. 
 306. Id. at 371; see also OECD, The Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in 
Tax Matters—Background, June 4, 2010, http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-
information/the conventiononmutualadministrativeassistanceintaxmatters-background.htm (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2013). As of February 17, 2013, forty-three countries had signed the Protocol 
to the Multilateral Convention. Council of Europe, Status of the Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters and Amending Protocol. (Feb. 17, 2013) (EC), 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=127&CM=1&DF=&CL=
ENG (last visited Jan. 11, 2013). 
 307. Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, OECD, pmbl., at 
4 (May 27, 2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-
information/Convention_On_Mutual_Administrative_Assistance_in_Tax_Matters_Report_and
_Explanation.pdf [hereinafter Multilateral Convention]. 
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or classes of persons.”308 The Multilateral Convention also includes 
provisions to facilitate automatic information exchange.309 
A blueprint for such a multilateral system would involve 
“reconciling the current EU, OECD, and U.S. approaches . . . [with 
respect to] routing, identification, reporting, scope, verification, and 
incentives.”310 In January 2010, the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs created the Treaty Relief and Compliance Enhancement 
(TRACE) Group to: (1) develop efficient treaty relief systems “to 
minimize administrative costs and allocate the costs to the 
appropriate parties”; and (2) identify “solutions that enhance 
countries’ abilities to ensure proper compliance with tax obligations, 
from the perspective of both source and residence countries.”311 The 
TRACE group issued a report on improving procedures for tax relief 
for cross-border investors in 2010312 and released an implementation 
package for a standardized system for effective withholding tax relief 
procedures for cross-border portfolio income in 2013.313 Under the 
OECD’s TRACE approach, financial institutions report information 
annually regarding specific items of income received by investors to 
the source country tax administrators who will automatically 
exchange the information with the “government of the investor’s 
residence country.”314 
EU financial institutions report on specific items of income 
received by an EU resident to the “government where the financial 
institution managing the assets resides.”315 This taxpayer information 
is then exchanged between the EU Member States pursuant to the 
EU Savings Directive and the Information Exchange Directive. 
 
 308. Grinberg, supra note 12, at 371; see also Explanatory Report to the Convention as 
Amended by the Protocol, Protocol Amending the Convention on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters (May 27, 2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-
of-tax-information/Explanatory_Report_ENG_%2015_04_2010.pdf. 
 309. Multilateral Convention, supra note 307, art. 6, at 31–32. 
 310. Grinberg, supra note 12, at 373. 
 311. OECD, Treaty Relief and Compliance Enhancement (TRACE)—Implementation 
Package approved by CFA, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchangeofinformation/treatyreliefand
complianceen hancementtrace.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2013). 
 312. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS TO 
PROCEDURES FOR TAX RELIEF FOR CROSS-BORDER INVESTORS: IMPLEMENTATION PACKAGE 
(2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/taxtreaties/44556378.pdf. 
 313. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., TRACE IMPLEMENTATION PACKAGE FOR 
THE ADOPTION OF THE AUTHORISED INTERMEDIARY SYSTEM (2013). 
 314. Id. at 5. 
 315. Id. 
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However, FATCA, as legislated, requires foreign financial 
institutions to report directly to the United States on assets held and 
income earned by U.S. persons. The IRS is evaluating the feedback 
received on the TRACE project before deciding whether to adopt 
any of the TRACE information exchange framework.316 
Many commentators have pointed out the conflict-of-law issues 
that arise with financial institutions reporting directly to the United 
States.317 Professor Morse recommended involvement of the non-
U.S. governments in the implementation of FATCA, and the 
intergovernmental agreements being negotiated accomplish this 
goal.318 Treasury Model I makes available a system similar to that 
used by the European Union in both the Savings Directive and 
Information Exchange Directive. Treasury Model II continues the 
direct bank to U.S. government reporting model but involves the 
foreign governments in removing any legal impediments to their 
financial institutions complying with FATCA. FATCA, as legislated, 
provides the mechanism for financial institutions in countries that 
did not sign an intergovernmental agreement to cooperate. 
Of course, the ability to implement FATCA in three distinct 
ways complicates the horizon. However, in July 2013, the G-20 
finance ministers unanimously endorsed the OECD’s proposal for a 
global model for multilateral automatic exchange of tax information 
and committed “to automatic exchange of information as the new 
global standard.”319 This is noteworthy as the G-20 also includes 
countries such as China, India, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Brazil, 
Indonesia, South Africa, and Argentina that are not members of the 
 
 316. Arora, supra note 137. 
 317. See, e.g., Harvey, supra note 209, at 478–79 (noting the conflict-of-laws issue with 
respect to the disclosing customer information to the IRS). In a 2011 report, the Information 
Reporting Program Advisory Committee cautioned the IRS that implementation of FATCA 
could run afoul of foreign laws. See Internal Revenue Service, 2011 IRPAC Report: 
International Reporting & Withholding Subgroup, http://www.irs.gov/Tax-
Professionals/2011-IRPAC-Report:-International-Reporting-&-Withholding-Subgroup (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2013) (“The obligations that FATCA imposes on FFIs . . . potentially conflict 
with legal constraints imposed on such FFIs under foreign law in a number of respects. For 
example, FATCA’s reporting requirements potentially contravene the privacy or data 
protections laws of a number of jurisdictions.”). 
 318. Morse, supra note 204, at 542−54. 
 319. G20 Leaders’ Declaration, at Tax Annex to the Saint Petersburg G20 Leaders 
Declaration G20 (Sept. 6, 2013), available at 
http://www.g20.org/news/20130906/782776427.html. 
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OECD.320 The OECD is working with the G-20 countries to 
develop this new global standard for the G-20 Finance Ministers and 
Central Bank Governors’ meeting in February 2014.321 The 
Multilateral Convention would play a key role in the implementation 
of the new standard. 
Clearly, FATCA has served as a lever for modernizing 
information exchange among governments.322 “As old information 
exchange processes evolve through initiatives like FATCA, the 
automatic exchange of information is fast becoming the gold 
standard.”323 The United States must further this movement toward 
global transparency by vigorously honoring the commitments made 
in the intergovernmental agreements with FATCA partners to 
support “relevant legislation to achieve such equivalent levels of 
automatic exchange.”324 This should include expansion of the bank 
deposit regulations to entity accounts beneficially owned by 
individuals as well as enactment of the Incorporation Transparency 
and Law Enforcement Assistance Act, S. 1465. As mentioned 
previously, Senators Levin, Grassley, and others are advocating this 
legislation to require states to document the beneficial owners of the 
corporations.325 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, is FATCA “a drone, an obnoxious, expensive, 
arrogant, extraterritorial program likely to cause a fair amount of 
collateral damage while occasionally hitting its targets” as Lee 
Sheppard points out or a snowball slowly collecting participants in 
the painful move toward automatic reporting? If “the endgame is a 
significant expansion of transparency that will feature increased 
automatic information exchange,”326 I believe that FATCA will 
 
 320. Daniel Pruzin, OECD Secretary-General See Broad G-20 Support for Tax Initiatives, 
Bloomberg Law, ITM Issue No. 135 (2013). 
 321. G20 Leaders’ Declaration, supra note 319. 
 322. Coder, supra note 59. 
 323. Arora, supra note 137 (citing Theodore Setzer, territory manager (international), 
LB&I). 
 324. U.K.-U.S. Agreement to Implement FATCA, supra note 123, art. 6, at 13–14; see 
also Press Release, HM Treasury, supra note 132. 
 325. See Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act, supra notes 
176– 178 and accompanying text. 
 326. Sapirie, supra note 135. 
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accomplish this goal. I am encouraged that the OECD and EU are 
seizing this opportunity to work with the United States in 
developing common reporting and due diligence standards for 
financial institutions. 
In part, success depends on those governments negotiating 
intergovernmental agreements demanding real reciprocity from the 
U.S. government. The IGA with Mexico has entered into force as of 
January 1, 2013 and sets forth a timeline for ever increasing items of 
information to be exchanged with Mexico. This agreement is an 
appropriate vehicle for the United States to demonstrate its renewed 
commitment to the exchange of information. The U.S. government 
must honor its promise to support the adoption of the relevant 
regulations and legislation that are necessary before the United 
States is able to provide its FATCA partners with the same 
information that they have been asked to provide the U.S. 
government. The United States should take this opportunity to be a 
role model for transparency by improving the bank deposit 
regulations to take into consideration entity accounts beneficially 
owned by individuals as well as pursuing whatever legislation is 
necessary so as to no longer function as a tax haven for tax evaders 
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